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CHAPTER 1 OIL PRICE SHOCKS AND INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION: IS THE 
RELATIONSHIP LINEAR?
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the oil price shocks of the 1970s, many economists have considered unexpected oil 
price fluctuations as one of the main sources of fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates. 
Linear models of the transmission of oil price shocks, however, cannot explain large fluctuations 
in U.S. real activity. This fact stimulated interest in models of an asymmetric and possibly 
nonlinear relationship between the real price of oil and U.S. real activity. For example, Loungani 
(1986) and Davis (1987a,b) emphasized asymmetries due to costly sectoral reallocation of 
resources. Mork (1989) observed that feedback from lagged real oil price increases appears 
negative and statistically significant, while the lagged feedback from oil price decreases is small 
and statistically insignificant. Given evidence in Hooker (1996) that Mork's model does not fit 
the data, Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) and Hamilton (1996, 2003) made the case that empirical work 
needed to take account of the environment in which the oil price increases take place. Their 
preferred specification combined asymmetries in the transmission of oil price shocks with 
additional nonlinearities.
2
 
                                                 
1
 Co-authored with Ana María Herrera and Tatsuma Wada. The authors thank two referees, Colin Cameron, Oscar 
Jordà, Hiroyuki Kasahara, Lutz Kilian, Vadim Marmer, Elena Pesavento, Zhongjun Qu, Shinichi Sakata, Mark 
Watson, and seminar participants at Boston University, University of British Columbia, University of California-
Davis, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2
 Specifically, Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) showed that oil price increases scaled by the standard deviation of recent 
volatility improved the fit of the predictive relationship between real GDP growth and relative to oil price changes. 
Similarly, Hamilton (1996, 2003) showed that a nonlinear transformation that records the net oil price increase over 
the previous 1-year or 3-year maximum improves the fit of a predictive model of real GDP growth. 
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By the beginning of the 2000s, a consensus had emerged in the literature regarding the 
nonlinear relationship between U.S. real economic activity and the price of oil, which in turn was 
thought to account for the seeming structural instability of linear models in the post-1986 era. 
Yet, recent work by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) --henceforth KV-- has called into question the 
view that unexpected oil price increases and decreases have an asymmetric effect on 
macroeconomic aggregates. They proved that the method commonly employed in the literature 
to evaluate the asymmetric and potentially nonlinear impact of oil price innovations produces 
inconsistent estimates and is likely to overestimate the impact of such shocks. They also showed 
that for a shock of typical magnitude the linear and symmetric model appears to provide a very 
good approximation to the responses of U.S. real GDP to innovations in the real price of oil. 
Our paper builds on these methodological insights, but broadens the scope of the 
analysis. First, we focus on the relationship between the price of oil and U.S. industrial 
production on the grounds that asymmetries are likely to be more prevalent in industrial 
production data than in real GDP data. If oil price innovations involve a costly reallocation of 
capital and labor, for example, then concentrating on real aggregate GDP might obscure the 
nature of the reallocative effect (see for instance, Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993; Davis and 
Haltiwanger, 2001). Second, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of sectoral disaggregates of 
U.S. industrial production, including sectors that one would expect to be particularly sensitive to 
the price of oil ex ante. The response of aggregate data represents a weighted average of possibly 
symmetric and possibly asymmetric responses across sectors. Thus, an obvious concern is that 
the finding of a symmetric response at the aggregate level could obscure important asymmetries 
at the sectoral level driven by different degrees of energy intensity in use and production at the 
sectoral level (see, e.g., Lee and Ni 2002). 
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We investigate the three leading specifications of asymmetric and possibly nonlinear 
feedback from the real price of oil to U.S. industrial production: the percent increase 
specification of Mork (1989) and the 1-year and 3-year net oil price increase specifications of 
Hamilton (1996, 2003). We start by testing for asymmetries and nonlinearities in the slope of the 
reduced-form relationship between industrial production growth and the real price of oil. Our 
results for these traditional slope-based tests are consistent with Hamilton's (2010) and KV's 
finding that the reduced-form relationship between oil prices and economic activity appears 
nonlinear in some transformations of the price of oil. Rejections of the linear model are more 
prevalent for the net oil price increase. We then use the modified slope-based test proposed in 
KV obtaining similar or even stronger results. 
None of the slope-based tests, however, directly addres the question of how asymmetric 
the response functions of industrial production are to positive and negative innovations in the 
real price of oil. We address this question using the impulse response function --henceforth IRF-- 
based test of symmetry proposed in KV. Overall, the IRF based test suggests strong evidence 
against the null of symmetric responses to innovations in the real price of oil using the 1947-
2009 sample. There is considerable disagreement, however, as to which sectors are most 
affected, depending on the specification chosen. For example, Mork's specification shows 
statistically significant asymmetric responses in the automobile sector, even after accounting for 
the data mining involved in considering a large number of sectors, whereas the behavioral 
specifications of Hamilton (1996, 2003) do not. 
There is reason to be cautious in interpreting these full-sample results, however, given 
evidence of a structural break in 1973 not only in the marginal distribution governing the real 
price of oil, but in the predictive relationship between the real price of oil and U.S. real economic 
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activity (see Dvir and Rogoff 2010, Kilian and Vigfusson 2010). Using post-1973 data, the 
evidence against symmetric responses to oil price innovations becomes considerably weaker. For 
example, for aggregate industrial production, there is no evidence against the hypothesis of 
symmetric responses to oil price innovations of typical magnitude, consistent with results by KV 
for U.S. real GDP. Yet, there is strong evidence of asymmetries at the disaggregate level based 
on the 3-year net increase measure, especially for industries that are energy intensive in 
production (such as chemicals) or that produce goods that are energy-intensive in use (such as 
transit equipment). This finding is consistent with our conjecture that asymmetries at the sectoral 
level may be obscured in the aggregate data. No such evidence is found for the other two oil 
price specifications, however, and even for the 3-year net increase specification the response of 
the motor vehicles and parts sector, for example, does not appear asymmetric. 
Our findings have important implications for the empirical literature regarding the effect 
of oil price shocks on industrial production. First, our results suggest that the response of 
industrial production growth to oil price innovations is asymmetric and nonlinear at least at the 
disaggregate level. Second, our results highlight the importance of developing multisector 
models of the transmission of oil price shocks. Third, our results are not consistent with standard 
theoretical explanations of asymmetries in the literature such as costly reallocation of labor or 
capital across sectors (see Hamilton, 1988) or asymmetries in the response of petroleum product 
prices to crude oil prices (Huntington, 1998), as these explanations rely on the asymmetry 
captured by Mork's (1989) oil price specification. The net oil price increase specifications in 
particular are not consistent with economic theory, but are based on (yet untested) behavioral 
arguments. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data. In section 3 we use slope 
based tests to test whether nonlinear oil price measures have explanatory power for industrial 
production in a reduced-form model and to test for nonlinearity in a more general model. In 
section 4 we employ the impulse response based tests of symmetry of KV to further inquire 
about the effect of unanticipated oil price shocks on industrial production. Section 5 concludes. 
     
2. Data 
We follow Mork (1989) and Lee and Ni (2002) in measuring nominal oil prices by the 
composite refiners' acquisition cost when possible (i.e., from 1974 onwards), making 
adjustments to account for the price controls of the 1970s, and extrapolating the data from 1947 
until 1974 by using the rate of growth of the producer price index. We then deflate the price of 
oil by the U.S. CPI. We use three different nonlinear transformations of the logarithm of the real 
oil price,   . First, Mork's (1989) oil price increase, which can be defined as: 
  
     {         }                                                         (1) 
This censoring of the oil price series was proposed by Mork (1989) after the 1985-86 fall in oil 
prices failed to lead to a boom in real GDP growth. He thus showed that whereas oil price 
increases preceded an economic recession; in contrast, he could not reject the null hypothesis 
that declines did not lead to expansions. Subsequently, Hooker (1996) and KV, among others, 
showed that this result vanishes in longer samples. 
The second and third measures are the net oil price increase over the previous 12-month 
maximum (Hamilton, 1996) 
   
      {         {              }                                                         (2) 
and the net oil price increase over the previous 36-month maximum (Hamilton, 2003) 
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      {         {              }                                                         (3)                                                       
These nonlinear transformations are intended to filter out increases in the price of oil that 
represent corrections for recent declines, and have been commonly used in the literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of oil prices (see for instance Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997; Davis 
and Haltiwanger, 2001; Lee and Ni, 2002). Note that in the text we report the results for the 
nonlinear transformations of the log of the real oil price. The results for the nonlinear 
transformation of the log of the nominal oil price (Hamilton 1996, 2003) are reported in the on-
line appendix.
3
 
To measure economic activity we use monthly data on the seasonally adjusted industrial 
production (IP) indices computed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. We report 
results for 37 indices of which 5 represent aggregates: total (or aggregate) IP index, 
manufacturing (SIC), manufacturing (NAICS), durable consumer goods and nondurable 
consumer goods. The total IP index measures the real output of the manufacturing, mining, and 
electric and gas utilities industries. The remaining 32 series represent both market and industry 
groups. Market groups comprise products and materials. Products include aggregates such as 
consumer goods, equipment and nonindustrial supplies, whereas materials correspond to inputs 
used in the manufacture of products. Industry groups include three-digit NAICS industries, and 
other industries that have traditionally been part of manufacturing such as newspaper, periodical, 
and books. The period spanned by the data varies across series depending on the availability of 
data on both oil prices and industrial production. Hence, the longest series span the period 
between January 1947 and September 2009, whereas the shortest series span the period between 
                                                 
3
 See Tables A.8-A.15 and A.22-A.29 in the on-line appendix, available at 
http://clas.wayne.edu/multimedia/usercontent/File/herrera/HLWappendix.pdf. 
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January 1986 and September 2009 (see Table A.1 of the on-line appendix for the period covered 
for each IP index). 
 
3. Slope based tests of nonlinearity 
3.1 Is the oil price-industrial production relation nonlinear? 
In order to investigate whether the one-step ahead forecast of industrial production of 
sector i is linear in lags of oil prices we estimate the following reduced-form equation by OLS: 
       ∑   
 
          ∑   
 
        ∑   
 
       
                                 (4)                                                       
where      denotes the log growth in the industrial production index for sector i at time t,    is the 
log growth in oil prices without any transformation,   
  is one of the nonlinear measures of oil 
price increases described in section 2 (  
  =   
    
     
  ),      is the residual for sector i at time t, 
and p is set equal to 12 months.
4
 
We then test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the nonlinear measure are all 
equal to zero; that is, γ₁=γ₂=...=γ₁₂=0. Table 1 reports the p-values for the Wald test of joint 
significance for each of the three nonlinear measures of oil prices. 
We start with the results for a test of symmetry; that is, the slope based test for the oil 
price increase,   
 , reported in the first panel in Table 1. At the 5% significance level, we reject 
the null of symmetry for 15 of the 37 industrial production indices. Of particular interest is the 
finding of asymmetry for chemicals and motor vehicles, industries that are either intensive in the 
use of energy in production or in the use by consumers. As can be seen in the first panel in Table 
1, using the net oil price increase over the previous 12-month maximum,   
   , also provides 
                                                 
4
 Our choice of twelve monthly lags is consistent with results in Hamilton and Herrera (2004), which suggest that 
using a smaller number of lags --as indicated by an information criterion such as the AIC or the BIC-- is not enough 
to capture the dynamic effect of oil prices on economic activity. 
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evidence in favor of an asymmetry in the slope of the relationship between oil prices and 
industrial production. We reject the null of symmetry for 19 out of the 37 indices. Similarly, 
evidence of nonlinearity can be found for 25 indices using the net oil price increase over the 
previous 36-month maximum,   
  . This result mirrors similar results in Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995) 
and Hamilton (1996). 
A couple of differences between the test results for the different measures of oil prices 
are worth noting. First, using Mork's oil price increase results in rejection of symmetry in the 
slope for 9 indices where one (or more) of the net oil price increase measures suggests 
symmetry. Second, whereas evidence of nonlinearity is not robust across measures of oil prices 
for the market group motor vehicles and parts, we do reject the null of linearity for all measures 
for motor vehicles. This result is consistent with the common view that oil price increases have a 
significant negative effect on the automobile sector. 
Overall, we do not find any evidence of asymmetry in the reduced-form equation (4) for 
apparel and leather goods, printing and related support industries, petroleum and coal products, 
pottery, ceramics and plumbing fixtures, clay product and refractory, and industrial machinery. 
Regardless of the oil price measure, the null of linearity is rejected for the total IP index, 
manufacturing (NAICS), nondurable consumer goods, foods and tobacco, paper products, and 
motor vehicles. For the remaining indices we find evidence of asymmetry for at least one of the 
oil price measures. 
 
3.2 The effect of including contemporaneous regressors 
KV propose a more powerful test of the null of symmetric slopes obtained by estimating 
a more general model of the oil price-macroeconomy relationship, which includes 
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contemporaneous values of    and   
  . Consider the data generating process for each of the IP 
series as being given by the bivariate dynamic model: 
       ∑      
  
         ∑      
  
                                        (5a)                                                       
         ∑      
  
         ∑      
  
          ∑      
  
       
                                (5b)     
Note that since the errors are uncorrelated we can estimate only (5b) by OLS and then test the 
null hypothesis that                        . The second panel in Table 1 reports the p-
values for a Wald test of joint significance for each of the three nonlinear measures of oil prices. 
Including the contemporaneous regressors provides stronger evidence of asymmetry. 
Using the oil price increase,   
 , we reject the null for 24 out of the 37 indices. Using   
   and   
   
we reject the null of linearity for 23 and 24 indices, respectively. Regardless of the measure of 
oil prices, we reject the null of linearity for 15 indices. Only 5 indices (apparel and leather goods, 
petroleum and coal products, pottery, ceramics and plumbing fixtures, clay products and 
refractory, and industrial machinery) show no evidence of asymmetry. Interestingly, petroleum 
and coal products, an industry that is intensive in the use of oil in production, shows no evidence 
of asymmetry. This is possibly because both increases and decreases in the price of oil (the main 
production input) have a significant and symmetric effect through the direct requirement of oil in 
production, whereas the effect of the shock through indirect input-output linkages may be more 
asymmetric. 
In brief, including the contemporaneous value of the oil price change and the nonlinear 
transformation of oil prices reveals more evidence of nonlinearity in the slope of the oil price-
industrial production relation. This result is in line with KV's simulation evidence of an increase 
in power when contemporaneous terms are included in the economic activity equation. 
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4. Impulse response function based test 
As was first noted by Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002), computing impulse responses in 
the textbook manner when one of the endogenous variables in the model is censored is 
problematic. KV show that the standard censored oil price VAR model is inherently 
misspecified, even if the data generating process is nonlinear and asymmetric, and cannot be 
consistently estimated. In addition, computing structural IRFs from nonlinear models as in linear 
models ignores the fact that the effect of a structural oil price innovation depends on the recent 
history of the censored variable   
  and the magnitude of the shock     in (5a).
5
 
Moreover, KV show that evidence of asymmetry (or for that matter lack thereof) in the reduced 
form slopes is not informative about the degree of asymmetry in the response of industrial 
production to an unanticipated oil price shock. We implement KV's impulse response based test. 
First, we compute structural IRFs,         
  , for a given horizon, h --conditional on the history 
  -- that take into account the size of the shock, δ. Then, we average over all the histories to 
obtain the unconditional IRF,        . We then compute the Wald test of the null of symmetric 
response functions: 
                                   
See section 1 of the on-line appendix for details on the computation of the test. We report the 
results for one and two standard deviation shocks; we will refer to these shocks as typical and 
large, respectively. 
  
                                                 
5
 See, for instance, Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1993) and Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) in the context of 
reduced form models and Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) in the context of structural models. 
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4.1 Is the response of industrial production to oil price shocks linear and symmetric? 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results corresponding to the test of symmetry of the IRF for the 
model (5) where   
    
 . Results for a typical shock are reported in Table 2, whereas results for 
a large shock are reported in Table 3. To conserve space, the tables in this article report the test 
results for only four horizons (h=0,1,6,12). The number of rejections, noted hereafter, is based 
on all the horizons (h=0,1,..,12) and thus might be smaller than the number of rejections found in 
Tables 2-5; they correspond to the number of rejections for all 13 horizons (i.e., h=0,1,2,...,12) in 
Tables A.2-A.7 found in the on-line appendix (see section 2).
6
 
Contrary to the findings of KV for real GNP and unemployment on a shorter sample, we 
find evidence of asymmetry in the aggregate IP indices (total, manufacturing SIC, manufacturing 
NAICS) for at least 6 horizons if the size of the shock is one standard deviation. At a more 
disaggregate level, we find evidence of asymmetry at one or more horizons for 20 indices (see 
the first panel of Table 2 and Table A.2 in the on-line appendix). Based on the two standard 
deviation test we find ample evidence of asymmetry (see the first panel of Table 3 and Table A.5 
of the on-line appendix). We reject the null of symmetry for 31 out of the 37 indices at the 5% 
significance level for at least one horizon. In particular, there is statistical evidence of asymmetry 
for manufacturing (NAICS) at all horizons, and for manufacturing (SIC) at all horizons but h=0, 
4. Only for non durable consumer goods, food, beverage and tobacco, textiles and products, 
petroleum and coal products, primary metal, and other transportation equipment are we not able 
to reject the null of symmetry. 
                                                 
6
 Impulse response functions for VARs using monthly data are typically computed for horizons of at least 12 
months. Here, given the computational burden involved in computing the test for 37 indices and 3 oil price 
measures, we restrict ourselves to 12 months after the shock. See Tables A.2-A.7 of the on-line appendix at 
http://www.clas.wayne.edu/multimedia/usercontent/File/herrera/HLWappendix.pdf. 
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Our finding of asymmetry in the response of the IP indices suggests that the oil price-
industrial production relationship is nonlinear. However, it has been argued that measures of oil 
price shocks that take into account the environment in which the increase took place do a better 
job at capturing the nature of the nonlinearity (see for instance Lee, Ni and Ratti, 1995 and 
Hamilton, 1996, 2003). Hence, we re-estimate the model (5) where   
  is now defined as the net 
oil price increase over the previous 12-month maximum,   
  . We then compute the test of 
symmetry of the IRF to typical and large oil price shocks. The test results for a typical and large 
shock are reported in the second panel of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Test results for all 
horizons h=0,1,...,12 are reported in Tables A.3 and A.6 of the on-line appendix. 
Our test results suggest there is some evidence of nonlinearity in the response of 
industrial production when we use the net oil price increase over the previous 12-month 
maximum. For a typical shock, we reject the null of symmetry for 19 indices at one or more 
horizons. For large shocks, evidence of asymmetry is considerably stronger: we can reject the 
null of a symmetry for 34 indices at one or more horizons. Only for three indices --food, 
beverage and tobacco, periodicals, books and other, and pottery, ceramics and plumbing fixtures-
- is there no evidence of nonlinearity in the response to an oil price shock. 
As a robustness check, we also compute the impulse response based tests for the net 
increase over the previous 36-month maximum (  
    
  ). The estimation results for a typical 
and a large shock are reported in the third panel of Tables 2 and 3, respectively. As can be seen 
by comparing the results for   
    
   and   
    
  , the results for the 36-month maximum are 
somewhat weaker. For both a typical and a large oil price shock we can reject the null of 
symmetry for at least 14 of the indices at one or more horizons (See tables A.4 and A.7 of the on-
line appendix). The main difference between the two measures is that we find less statistical 
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evidence of a nonlinear effect using   
   than with   
   for sectors with samples that start in 1967 
or later.
7
 
But, how big is the difference between the response to positive and negative shocks? To 
illustrate the magnitude of this distance Figure 1 plots the responses         and           to a 
typical shock for the total IP index, manufacturing (SIC and NAICS), motor vehicles and parts, 
transit equipment, and chemical products. Figures A.1a - A.1e and A.2a - A.2e in the on-line 
appendix plot the responses for both a typical and a large shock for the total IP index, 
manufacturing, (SIC and NAICS), all the market groups, motor vehicles and parts, and all 
industry groups with data starting in 1972 or earlier. Note that to facilitate the comparison, we 
plot the response to a positive shock,        , and the negative of the response to a negative 
shock,          . The responses are measured in percentages and the horizontal axis represents 
months after the shock. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the responses to a typical shock look very similar. Differences 
are noticeable mostly at short (h<5) or long horizons (h>10), especially for the total IP index and 
manufacturing (SIC and NAICS). For instance, depending on the nonlinear transformation of oil 
prices, at h=11 the value of the response to a positive shock,         for the total IP is between 
40% and 67% larger than the response to a negative shock,          . Similarly, the difference 
for manufacturing SIC (NAICS)         is between 27% (17%) and 50% (26%) larger than 
         , depending on the oil price measure. Results not reported herein- but available on the 
on-line appendix
8
-- illustrate that for a large shock the initial difference between the two impulse 
responses might not seem large. Yet, for many indices the responses         and 
                                                 
7
 Oil price shocks have a statistically significant effect only for 3 of the 10 sectors where we cannot reject the null of 
symmetry (textiles and products, electrical equipment and clay product and refractory). 
8
 See Figures A.2a-A.2e in the on-line appendix. 
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         diverge more as time passes. For instance, for the total IP and manufacturing (SIC 
and NAICS), the response to a positive shock is more than twice the size of the response to a 
negative shock at h=12. 
To summarize, we find evidence against the joint null of linearity and symmetry for most 
of the aggregates, most of the market groups and some of the industry groups. Furthermore, 
statistical evidence in favor of a nonlinear relationship between oil prices and industrial 
production appears to be stronger for the net oil price increase measure over the 12-month 
maximum (Hamilton 1996) than for the positive oil price change proposed by Mork (1989). 
These results suggest that inferring the effect of unanticipated oil price shocks on economic 
activity from the usual linear impulse response analysis might be flawed, especially for the 
aggregates and some sectors such as motor vehicles and chemicals. Departures from symmetry 
for a typical one standard deviation shock measured as the ratio of the positive to negative 
response range from 17% to 67% for the total IP index and the aggregates, depending on the 
nonlinear transformation. In contrast, a linear approximation might work well for the typical 
shocks in a number of industries. 
 
4.2 The effect of dropping the pre-1973 data 
The test results reported in the previous section suggest that contrary to what was found 
by KV for aggregate GDP data on a shorter sample, unexpected oil price increases and decreases 
appear to have an asymmetric effect on industrial production. Two possible explanations for such 
a difference --that cannot be directly tested-- stem from differences in the computation of GDP 
and IP indices. First, whereas GDP is a measure of the value added in the economy, the IP index 
measures gross output. Second, the IP index excludes services, a sector that has gained 
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importance over time in the U.S. economy and that being less energy intensive (in use and 
consumption) than manufacturing is less likely to exhibit a significant response to oil price 
shocks. A third (and testable) possible source of divergence is the difference in the sample period 
due to a structural break in the predictive relationship between the real price of oil and U.S. 
output in 1973 (see KV). Hence, in this section we report the results for the 1973:1-2009:9 
subsample. Tables 4 and 5 report the results for these IRF based test for one and two standard 
deviations shocks at horizons h=0,1,6,12, respectively. Tables for horizons h=0,1,2,...,12 are 
available in section 2 of the on-line appendix (see Tables A.16-A.21). 
There are two reasons why we could expect these results to be different from the full 
sample. One is that the responses are likely to be different, given statistical evidence of a 
structural break in 1973. The other is that reducing the number of observations in the sample 
increases estimation uncertainty and, all else equal, would be expected to lower the power of 
tests and to reduce the number of rejections for the 1973-2009 subsample, if asymmetry holds. 
As we will show below, the loss of power alone cannot explain our findings. 
For a typical shock, we find that the test statistic is significant at the 5% level for at least 
one horizon for 11, 7 and 10 of the 29 IP indices in the subsample using the oil price measure 
  
  =   
    
     
  , respectively. (See Tables A.16-A.18 in section 2 of the on-line appendix). As it 
can be seen in Table 4, for the total IP index we are only able to reject the null of symmetry at 
the 10% level for h=1 when we use the oil price increase (  
  =   
 ) or the net oil price increase 
with respect to the previous 12 months (  
  =   
  ). Evidence of asymmetry for manufacturing 
(SIC and NAICS) is also less prevalent and less consistent across oil price measures in the 
1973:1-2009:9 subsample. Yet, as it is the case for the full sample, the number of rejections is 
considerably larger when we test for symmetry in the response to a large shock. We reject the 
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null at the 5% level for 22, 27 and 12 of the 29 IP indices in the subsample using the oil price 
measure   
  =   
    
     
  , respectively (See Tables A.19-A.21 in section 2 of the on-line 
appendix). 
All in all, these results are consistent with KV's original conclusion that a linear model 
appears to provide a good approximation to the response of aggregate measures of economic 
activity to a typical real oil price innovation in post-1973 data. For large oil price innovations, 
however, nonlinear asymmetric models appear to provide a marginally better approximation to 
the response of both aggregate and sectoral IP indices to oil price shocks. 
 
4.3 Should we interpret the sectoral rejections as evidence of nonlinearity at the aggregate 
level? 
The results from the IRF based tests allow two interpretations. First, one could interpret 
the rejections as evidence against linearity in the response of a particular IP index to an oil price 
shock. That is, rejecting the null for a number of sectors would not be taken as evidence that the 
response of IP as a whole is nonlinear. Instead, one would consider this as evidence that the 
response of the particular sector is better approximated by a nonlinear model. Such an 
interpretation is straightforward and does not require additional discussion. 
 However, a second interpretation would take a large number of rejections as evidence 
against linearity in the response of aggregate production measured by the total IP index. 
Moreover, because the total IP index and the aggregates are constructed as a weighted average of 
the production indices (with weights that change over time), one may expect aggregation across 
industries to "average out" the nonlinearities if the number of rejections is small. Our estimation 
results appear to run against this view as in the full sample we reject the null of symmetry for the 
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total IP index and for manufacturing but not for a large number of industries. To understand this 
result it is important to recall that the effect of a shock that affects a number of industries, such as 
an oil price increase, depends on two factors: the behavior of the sectoral weights and the degree 
of comovement across sectors. Work by Foerster, Sarte and Watson (2008) suggests that sectoral 
weights play little role in explaining the variability of the total IP index. Instead, they find that as 
in Shea (2002), variability of the total IP index is mainly driven complementarities in production, 
such as input-output linkages, which work as propagation mechanisms for aggregate and sectoral 
shocks. While quantifying the importance of these two factors is beyond the scope of our paper, 
our results in conjunction with Foerster, Sarte and Watson's (2008) findings suggest that the 
covariability among sectors plays an important role in explaining the response of the aggregates 
to oil price shocks. 
  
4.4 The effect of data mining 
One additional concern with interpreting the disaggregate results as evidence of 
asymmetry at the aggregate level is that there is an element of data mining involved. That is, 
such an interpretation would ignore the fact that we have conducted 37 Wald tests for each oil 
price measure. Conventional critical values do not account for repeated applications of the IRF 
based test to alternative IP indices.
9
 To address this concern we simulate the null distribution of 
the supremum of the bootstrap test statistic across all disaggregates for each of the oil price 
measures.
10
 Test statistics that are significant at 5% and 10% level are denoted by ** and *, 
respectively, in Tables 2-5. 
                                                 
9
 See Inoue and Kilian(2004) and Kilian and Vega (2010) for the effect of data mining and solutions to the problem 
of data mining in the related context of tests of predictability. 
10
 The critical values that account for data mining are based on 100 pseudo series generated using the estimated 
coefficients for the subsample that covers all 37 indices for the full sample and 29 indices for the 1973-2009 
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  As one would expect, accounting for data mining reduces the number of rejections. Using 
the full sample and a typical shock, we are still able to reject the null of symmetry at the 5% 
level for at least one horizon for the total IP index and SIC manufacturing across all oil price 
measures (see Table 2). Evidence of asymmetry is more prevalent for Mork's (1989) oil price 
increase (  
  =   
 ) than for the net oil price increase and it is consistent across at least two oil 
price measures for foods and tobacco, durable consumer goods, miscellaneous durable goods, 
and transit equipment. 
Using the full sample and a large shock, and accounting for data mining, we are able to 
reject the null of symmetry at the 5% level for one horizon for the total IP index and SIC 
manufacturing using the net oil price increase over the previous 36-month maximum (see Table 
3). In addition, at the 5% level we are able to reject the null of symmetry for at least one horizon 
for transit equipment using the net oil price increase over the previous 12-month maximum. 
For the 1973-2009 subsample and a typical shock, evidence of asymmetry is found for at 
least one horizon using one of the oil measures for transit equipment, foods and tobacco, food, 
beverage and tobacco, petroleum and coal, plastics and rubber, and machinery; we are able to 
reject the null of symmetry for at least one horizon using one of the oil measures at the 5% level. 
However, once we account for data mining, we do not find any evidence of asymmetry using the 
subsample and a large shock. This finding illustrates that much of the evidence of asymmetries 
appears to be driven by data from the pre-1973 period. This is consistent both with the view that 
tests on the subsample have lower power against the null of symmetry and the view that there 
was a structural change in the transmission of oil price shocks in 1973. 
     
                                                                                                                                                             
subsample. For each series, we use 100 replications to obtain the conditional IRFs (R=100 in section 1 of the on-line 
appendix) and 100 bootstraps to get the test statistic. 
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5. Conclusions 
The view that the oil price-output relationship is asymmetric and nonlinear has been 
questioned by KV. They showed that conventional censored oil price VAR studies of the 
macroeconomic effect of oil price shocks generally produce inconsistent estimates of the true 
effects of unanticipated increases in the price of oil due to the censoring applied to the oil price 
variable. Their paper stresses the importance of correctly specifying the model to be estimated, 
of using appropriate estimators, and of formally testing the dynamic effects of unexpected oil 
price changes on U.S. real GDP, when the underlying dynamic relationship is possibly 
asymmetric and/or nonlinear. 
This paper explored these same issues in the context of monthly U.S. industrial 
production data. We first tested for nonlinearity in the slope of a reduced-form relation between 
domestic real economic activity and the real price of oil. We found evidence of asymmetric 
slopes for 15 of the 37 indices using the oil price increase,   
 , and for 19 (25) indices using the 
net oil price increase,   
     
   . 
We also explored whether our findings are robust to the inclusion of the 
contemporaneous value of the oil price series, as suggested by KV. The results for this slope 
based test are very similar to those obtained using the forecasting equation. We find evidence of 
asymmetric slopes for 24 out of the 37 indices, using the oil price increase,   
 , and for 23 (24) IP 
indices using the net oil price increase over the previous 12 (36) month maximum. 
  Evidence of nonlinearity is even stronger when we use the IRF based test proposed by 
KV, in particular for the net oil price increase measures. We reject the null of symmetry for at 
least 70% of the IP indices for typical shocks and for most of the indices if the oil price shock is 
large. Departures from symmetry are economically significant for the typical shock, especially 
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for the total IP index, manufacturing (SIC and NAICS) and sectors such as motor vehicles and 
chemicals. For larger shocks, departures from symmetry are economically significant for an 
additional number of industries. These results, however, become much weaker after accounting 
for the data mining that is inherent in evaluating many industrial production indices. 
The baseline results are highly sensitive to whether pre-1973 data are included in the 
regression or not, possibly due to a structural break in the predictive relationship between the real 
price of oil and U.S. economic activity in 1973 (see, e.g., Kilian and Vigfusson, 2010). For the 
post-1973 period we find no evidence against the hypothesis that aggregate industrial production 
responds symmetrically to oil price innovations of typical magnitude, consistent with findings 
for real GDP growth in Kilian and Vigfusson (2009, 2010). Yet, there is strong evidence against 
the hypothesis of symmetric responses at the disaggregate level, even after accounting for data 
mining, for the 3-year net oil price increase specification. This finding is important because it 
shows that even on post-1973 data, the impulse response based test has sufficient power to detect 
departures from the joint null hypothesis of linearity and symmetry. 
Like Kilian and Vigfusson (2010), we also find that there is statistically significant 
evidence of asymmetric aggregate responses to large oil price innovations in the 1973-2009 data. 
There is no evidence of corresponding significant rejections at the sectoral level in response to 
such large oil price innovations, however, perhaps because such shocks are rare and imprecisely 
estimated, undermining the power of the test. 
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Table 1 : Slope based test of nonlinearity 
 Forecasting Equation Structural Equation  
Sector   
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
     
  =   
    
  =   
   
 
 
  
  =   
   
Total index 0 0.04 0 0 0.01 0 
Foods and tobacco 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 
Clothing 0.01 0.12 0.77 0.01 0.11 0.69 
Durable consumer goods 0.08 0.38 0.04 0.02 0.14 0.04 
Miscellaneous durable goods 0.29 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0 
Nondurable consumer goods 0.04 0 0 0.03 0 0 
Manufacturing (SIC) 0 0.08 0 0 0.03 0 
Paper products 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Chemical products 0 0.1 0 0 0.03 0 
Transit equipment 0.18 0.11 0 0.17 0.1 0 
Textiles materials 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Paper materials 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 
Chemical materials 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.03 
Motor vehicles and parts 0 0.57 0.14 0 0.3 0.15 
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.15 0.21 0 0.12 0.19 0 
Textiles and products 0.66 0.03 0.1 0.48 0.02 0.11 
Apparel and leather goods 0.5 0.15 0.45 0.26 0.15 0.39 
Paper 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.04 0 0.01 
Printing and related 0.06 0.19 0.42 0.01 0.01 0.2 
Chemicals 0 0.12 0.16 0 0.1 0.08 
Petroleum and coal 0.89 0.52 0.16 0.84 0.47 0.15 
Plastics and rubber 0.15 0.01 0 0.03 0.01 0 
Furniture 0.06 0.01 0.03 0 0 0.02 
Primary metal 0.34 0.19 0.02 0.32 0.11 0 
Fabricated metal 0.53 0 0 0.3 0 0 
Machinery 0.11 0 0.02 0.05 0 0.01 
Electrical equipment 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0.01 
Motor vehicles 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 0.01 0.05 0 0 0.02 0 
Newspaper 0.01 0.07 0 0.01 0.02 0 
Periodical books and other 0.03 0.16 0 0.04 0.14 0.01 
Pottery, ceramics and plumbing 0.1 0.79 0.83 0.11 0.85 0.8 
Glass and glass products 0 0 0.18 0 0 0.26 
Clay product and refractory 0.36 0.37 0.62 0.33 0.33 0.7 
Industrial machinery 0.09 0.18 0.3 0.06 0.08 0.2 
Other transportation equipment 0.3 0 0.01 0.24 0 0.01 
Navigational, measuring and other 0.01 0.19 0 0 0.16 0 
Note: This table reports the p-values for a Robust Wald Test of the joint significance of the lags of   
  in the reduced-form equation (4) 
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Table 2. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock - Full sample 
   
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
   
Sector 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 
Total index 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.04** 0.00** 0.00** 0.02** 0.00** 0.55 0.14 0.06* 0.00** 
Foods and tobacco 0.29 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.34 0.33 0.00** 0.00** 0.51 0.77 0.11 0.01** 
Clothing 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.27 0.16 0.36 0.02** 0.01** 0.66 0.79 0.96 0.75 
Durable consumer goods 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.16 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.44 0.09 0.06* 0.01** 
Miscellaneous durable goods 0.00** 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.00** 0.00** 0.03** 0.01** 0.32 0.08 0.09* 0.03** 
Nondurable consumer goods 0.2 0.27 0.11 0.35 0.11 0.07 0.01** 0.00** 0.93 0.35 0.11 0.06** 
Manufacturing (SIC) 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.07** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.47 0.09 0.05* 0.00** 
Paper products 0.21 0.3 0.05 0.10* 0.39 0.63 0.09* 0.17** 0.95 0.87 0.7 0.09** 
Chemical products 0.85 0.22 0.16 0.09* 0.02 0.03 0.11* 0.10** 0.6 0.26 0.09* 0.20* 
Transit equipment 0.42 0.04 0.03 0.08** 0.28 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 0.6 0.73 0.03** 0.00** 
Textiles materials 0.08 0.01 0.02** 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.47 0.44 0.05 0.11 0.42 0.53 
Paper materials 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.48 0.15 0.34 0.5 0.66 
Chemical materials 0.71 0.00** 0.02** 0.07** 0.6 0.03 0.27 0.32 0.92 0.15 0.35 0.49 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.68 0.01 0.00** 0.00** 0.27 0.04 0.23 0.37 0.64 0.05 0.29 0.66 
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.47 0.16 0.14 0.57 0.7 0.82 0.58 0.89 0.37 0.07 0.12 0.41 
Textiles and products 0.11 0.09 0.42 0.68 0.18 0.28 0.52 0.78 0.88 0.11 0.49 0.88 
Apparel and leather goods 0.03 0.08 0.32 0.62 0.55 0.8 0.43 0.69 0.91 0.44 0.53 0.44 
Paper 0.11 0.02 0.16 0.48 0.1 0.24 0.5 0.83 0.17 0.26 0.4 0.78 
Printing and related 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.29 0.02 0.06 0.32 0.76 0.11 0.22 0.64 0.83 
Chemicals 0.69 0.00** 0.00** 0.02** 0.54 0.2 0.57 0.75 0.32 0.03 0.08* 0.31* 
Petroleum and coal 0.26 0.17 0.75 0.96 0.18 0.14 0.75 0.88 0.03 0.07 0.06* 0.35 
Plastics and rubber 0.03 0.07 0.39 0.09* 0.2 0.37 0.74 0.67 0.7 0.26 0.26 0.30* 
Furniture 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.45 0.02 0.06 0.35 0.65 0.07 0.18 0.35 0.54 
Primary metal 0.32 0.19 0.61 0.83 0.11 0.04 0.34 0.73 0.07 0.18 0.35 0.54 
Fabricated metal 0.09 0.04 0.29 0.68 0.06 0.04 0.43 0.68 0.1 0.05 0.33 0.57 
Machinery 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.56 0.16 0.06 0.39 0.64 0.11 0.06 0.22 0.47 
Electrical equipment 0.07 0.17 0.43 0.12* 0.08 0.15 0.62 0.57 0.25 0.35 0.78 0.81 
Motor vehicles 0.46 0.01 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.04 0.39 0.73 0.99 0.04 0.33 0.75 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 0.06 0 0.02* 0.12* 0.07 0.08 0.51 0.87 0.6 0.07 0.33 0.62 
Newspaper 0.96 0.27 0.17 0.55 0.14 0.21 0.5 0.89 0.12 0.13 0.34 0.8 
Periodical books and other  0.36 0.17 0.25 0.68 0.41 0.69 0.8 0.98 0.62 0.16 0.45 0.81 
Pottery, ceramics and plumbing  0.3 0.06 0.12 0.39 0.37 0.59 0.7 0.95 0.65 0.72 0.83 0.99 
Glass and glass products  0.16 0.28 0.25 0.62 0.24 0.38 0.79 0.85 0.46 0.75 0.93 0.98 
Clay product and refractory 0.76 0.32 0.42 0.85 0.17 0.27 0.62 0.91 0.61 0.36 0.8 0.96 
Industrial machinery 0.26 0.16 0.42 0.78 0.04 0.12 0.58 0.67 0.12 0.3 0.51 0.7 
Other transportation equipment 0.26 0.28 0.54 0.85 0.96 0.77 0.5 0.84 0.41 0.58 0.68 0.94 
Navigational, measuring and other 0.11 0.27 0.2 0.48 0.91 0.35 0.76 0.82 0.72 0.25 0.35 0.63 
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Table 3. IRF based test of symmetry for 2 s.d. shock - Full sample 
   
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
   
Sector 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 
Total index 0.15 0.1 0.06 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.01 0.04 0.00** 
Foods and tobacco 0.34 0.21 0.06 0.1 0.38 0.44 0 0 0.17 0.03 0 0.00* 
Clothing 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.16 0.38 0.01 0 0.35 0.64 0.72 0.38 
Durable consumer goods 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.00* 
Miscellaneous durable 
goods 
0.01 0.02 0.11 0.2 0 0 0.01 0 0.03 0 0.07 0 
Nondurable consumer 
goods 
0.24 0.35 0.15 0.34 0.11 0.1 0 0 0.86 0.03 0 0.00* 
Manufacturing (SIC) 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.11 0 0.04 0.00** 
Paper products 0.27 0.38 0.03 0.01 0.39 0.56 0.01 0 0.79 0.41 0.13 0.01 
Chemical products 0.86 0.26 0.2 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.24 0 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.04 
Transit equipment 0.47 0.08 0.01 0 0.39 0.01 0 0.00** 0.07 0.01 0.03 0 
Textiles materials 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.03 
Paper materials 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.03 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.15 0.28 0.38 0.14 
Chemical materials 0.72 0 0 0 0.59 0 0.01 0.00* 0.91 0.1 0.05 0 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.71 0 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 0.66 0.01 0.03 0.12 
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.49 0.17 0.07 0.29 0.65 0.77 0.09 0.11 0.38 0.06 0.06 0.21 
Textiles and products 0.12 0.09 0.27 0.35 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.02 0.89 0.07 0.33 0.47 
Apparel and leather goods 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.46 0.71 0.11 0.07 0.96 0.46 0.39 0.45 
Paper 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.33 0.41 0.53 
Printing and related 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.11 0.2 0.46 
Chemicals 0.72 0 0 0 0.47 0.04 0.15 0 0.35 0.01 0.04 0.12 
Petroleum and coal 0.3 0.19 0.77 0.96 0.12 0.04 0.45 0.23 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.2 
Plastics and rubber 0.03 0.07 0.26 0 0.07 0.13 0.08 0 0.71 0.27 0.02 0.1 
Furniture 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.17 
Primary metal 0.36 0.2 0.51 0.69 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.1 0.15 0.27 
Fabricated metal 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.4 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.1 0.01 0.13 0.21 
Machinery 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.25 0.08 0 0 0 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.11 
Electrical equipment 0.08 0.18 0.32 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.09 0 0.23 0.29 0.44 0.45 
Motor vehicles 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.99 0.02 0.06 0.17 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 0.05 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0.59 0.01 0.03 0.13 
Newspaper 0.96 0.24 0 0 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.24 
Periodical books and other  0.32 0.09 0 0.03 0.3 0.51 0.11 0.14 0.61 0.07 0.21 0.6 
Pottery, ceramics and 
plumbing  
0.28 0.03 0 0 0.24 0.26 0.12 0.5 0.6 0.76 0.83 0.99 
Glass and glass products  0.12 0.19 0 0 0.11 0.08 0 0.01 0.41 0.63 0.43 0.72 
Clay product and refractory 0.75 0.24 0.07 0.27 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.59 0.19 0.69 0.85 
Industrial machinery 0.25 0.1 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.1 0.14 0.39 0.36 
Other transportation 
equipment 
0.22 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.96 0.7 0.02 0 0.38 0.62 0.38 0.81 
Navigational, measuring 
and other 
0.1 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.94 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.71 0.19 0.11 0.26 
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Table 4. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock - 1973-2009 subsample 
   
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
   
Sector 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 
Total index 0.14 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.5 0.74 0.88 0.18 0.65 0.8 
Foods and tobacco 0.29 0.13 0.31 0.57 0.42 0.62 0.77 0.96 0.28 0.11 0.06** 0.33 
Clothing 0.09 0.2 0.47 0.71 0.86 0.5 0.47 0.71 0.8 0.25 0.34 0.67 
Durable consumer goods 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.27 0.22 0.3 0.84 0.94 0.99 0.08 0.22 0.66 
Miscellaneous durable goods 0.02 0.07 0.51 0.81 0.07 0.12 0.44 0.78 0.15 0.13 0.26 0.63 
Nondurable consumer goods 0.13 0.29 0.53 0.75 0.31 0.59 0.65 0.92 0.41 0.26 0.76 0.97 
Manufacturing (SIC) 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.42 0.14 0.06 0.39 0.74 0.53 0.06 0.21 0.26 
Paper products 0.15 0.33 0.06 0.29 0.42 0.49 0.42 0.66 0.69 0.37 0.21 0.47 
Chemical products 0.68 0.17 0.14 0.28 0.22 0.44 0.76 0.97 0.19 0.28 0.29 0.62 
Transit equipment 0.5 0.12 0.14 0.38 0.23 0.13 0.43 0.48 0.02* 0.00** 0.01** 0.00** 
Textiles materials 0.14 0.06 0.19 0.46 0.07 0.16 0.34 0.7 0.2 0.29 0.2 0.48 
Paper materials 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.29 0.04 0.11 0.44 0.86 0.31 0.31 0.3 0.72 
Chemical materials 0.65 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.46 0.12 0.4 0.69 0.79 0.2 0.08 0.26 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.71 0.02 0.07 0.2 0.27 0.12 0.52 0.73 0.34 0.02* 0.11 0.39 
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.25 0.13 0.24 0.54 0.32 0.48 0.63 0.9 0.35 0.12 0.03** 0.24 
Textiles and products 0.18 0.07 0.42 0.76 0.93 0.78 0.6 0.74 0.81 0.19 0.46 0.82 
Apparel and leather goods 0.1 0.25 0.59 0.82 0.03 0.1 0.44 0.87 0.89 0.5 0.68 0.84 
Paper 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.37 0.04 0.11 0.44 0.81 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.59 
Printing and related 0.07 0.08 0.37 0.8 0.17 0.1 0.46 0.74 0.1 0.21 0.44 0.66 
Chemicals 0.79 0 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.36 0.75 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.22* 
Petroleum and coal 0.27 0.12 0.61 0.95 0.27 0.38 0.73 0.92 0.05 0.06 0.01** 0.10** 
Plastics and rubber 0.07 0.18 0.64 0.63 0.03 0.11 0.44 0.75 0.96 0.31 0.2 0.07** 
Furniture 0.03 0.09 0.38 0.55 0.03 0.11 0.44 0.75 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.54 
Primary metal 0.52 0.2 0.54 0.81 0.05 0.05 0.4 0.63 0.06 0.15 0.21 0.13* 
Fabricated metal 0.16 0.19 0.67 0.92 0.19 0.03 0.29 0.71 0.18 0.11 0.15 0.33 
Machinery 0.1 0.06 0.25 0.61 0.07 0.15 0.7 0.87 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.11** 
Electrical equipment 0.13 0.28 0.75 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.7 0.87 0.2 0.39 0.68 0.37 
Motor vehicles 0.88 0.03 0.15 0.32 0.17 0.09 0.54 0.81 0.94 0.08 0.13 0.46 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 0.1 0.03 0.12 0.43 0.16 0.06 0.39 0.74 0.57 0.06 0.2 0.26 
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Table 5. IRF based test of symmetry for 2 s.d. shock - 1973-2009 subsample 
   
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
   
Sector 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 0 1 6 12 
Total index 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.67 0.03 0.05 0.09 
Foods and tobacco 0.26 0.51 0.57 0.66 0.64 0.89 0.29 0.54 0.3 0.17 0.12 0.36 
Clothing 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.84 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.88 0.27 0.37 0.63 
Durable consumer goods 0.09 0.03 0 0 0.07 0 0.03 0.07 0.67 0.09 0.25 0.35 
Miscellaneous durable goods 0.01 0.04 0.27 0.46 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.17 0.06 0.2 0.38 
Nondurable consumer goods 0.11 0.24 0.35 0.53 0.22 0.44 0.02 0.02 0.53 0.2 0.28 0.69 
Manufacturing (SIC) 0.06 0 0 0.02 0.04 0 0.01 0 0.56 0.02 0.03 0.1 
Paper products 0.16 0.34 0 0.01 0.31 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.77 0.43 0.06 0.13 
Chemical products 0.7 0.12 0.01 0 0.11 0.23 0.43 0.38 0.29 0.29 0.38 0.65 
Transit equipment 0.54 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.02 0 0.06 0.03 0.12 0.09 
Textiles materials 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.01 0 0.23 0.43 0.39 0.65 
Paper materials 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.31 0.49 0.37 0.6 
Chemical materials 0.66 0 0.01 0 0.38 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.79 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Motor vehicles and parts 0.72 0 0 0 0.23 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.49 0.04 0.06 0.31 
Food, beverage and tobacco 0.28 0.1 0.07 0.11 0.22 0.32 0.03 0.09 0.37 0.17 0.06 0.26 
Textiles and products 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.41 0.06 0.12 0.01 0 0.89 0.2 0.42 0.63 
Apparel and leather goods 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.94 0.7 0.21 0.06 0.98 0.58 0.64 0.78 
Paper 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.06 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.44 0.28 0.5 
Printing and related 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.26 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.11 0.18 0.2 0.5 
Chemicals 0.8 0 0 0 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.42 0.02 0.07 0.13 
Petroleum and coal 0.29 0.11 0.59 0.92 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.25 
Plastics and rubber 0.07 0.19 0.49 0.07 0.2 0.23 0.04 0 0.95 0.33 0.06 0.03 
Furniture 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.11 0 0.01 0 0 0.09 0.21 0.21 0.36 
Primary metal 0.54 0.19 0.52 0.64 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.1 0.15 
Fabricated metal 0.16 0.14 0.54 0.8 0.01 0 0 0 0.2 0.04 0.23 0.45 
Machinery 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.17 0.07 0 0 0 0.09 0.05 0.18 0.21 
Electrical equipment 0.13 0.25 0.56 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.12 0 0.21 0.31 0.28 0.41 
Motor vehicles 0.89 0.01 0.01 0 0.11 0 0.01 0.06 0.96 0.07 0.04 0.17 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 0.07 0 0 0.02 0.06 0 0.01 0 0.6 0.03 0.04 0.11 
 
Notes for Tables 2-5: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (5) . p-values are based on the     
 . Bold and 
italics denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. ** and * denote significance after accounting for 
data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1a: Impulse Response to two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real oil price (percentage) 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on VAR in (5) where the number of replications to obtain the IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 1b: Impulse Response to two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real oil price 
(percentage)  
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on VAR in (5) where the number of replications to obtain the IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 1c: Impulse Response to two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real oil price (percentage) 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on VAR in (5) where the number of replications to obtain the IRFs equal 1000.   
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CHAPTER 2 NONLINEARITIES IN THE OIL PRICE-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 
RELATIONSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM 18 OECD COUNTRIES
1
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the oil price shocks of the 1970s, economists have considered oil price movements 
as a main source of fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates. A negative correlation between 
energy prices and aggregate measures of output has been reported for the United States,
2
 
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, and Sweden. Until recently, there appeared to be a widespread 
agreement that unexpected increases in the price of oil lead to recessions in industrialized oil-
importing economies while oil price decreases did not lead to booms. In other words, the effect 
of unexpected oil price shocks on economic activity has been thought to be asymmetric.
3
 
Amongst different reasons why an oil shock affects macroeconomic variables, some of 
them might require a non-linear specification of the oil price--macroeconomy relationship 
(Cunado and Gracia 2005). The oil price shock can work by redistributing income between net 
oil importing and net oil exporting countries. Alternately, it might lead to fall in productivity due 
to reduced energy use and hence fall in labor supply due to lower wages directly affecting 
potential output (Cunado and Gracia 2005). Furthermore, it may have a nonlinear effect on 
economic activity if it affects through sectoral reallocations of resources (see for instance, 
                                                 
1
 Co-authored with Ana María Herrera and Tatsuma Wada. The authors thank Elena Pesavento, Lutz Kilian, and 
seminar participants at Emory University and Midwestern Economic Association 2011 Conference. 
2
 Evidence of a negative effect of oil price shocks on U.S. economic activity has been found by Rasche and Tatom 
(1977, 1981), Hamilton (1988, 1996, 2003), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1996), Daniel (1997), and Carruth, Hooker, and Oswald (1998), among others. 
3
 Mork, Mysen and Olsen (1994) find a significant relationship between oil price increases and slower economic 
growth for net importing countries such as the U.S., Canada, Japan, the U.K., Germany and France, and a positive 
relation for Norway. These results are confirmed by Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003) for some nonlinear 
transformations of oil prices using a sample of European countries covering the 1960-1999 period. Similar but 
somewhat weaker results are found by Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) for a number of OECD countries. 
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Hamilton, 1988; Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993; Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001) or depressing 
irreversible investment through their effects on uncertainty. The former literature argues that 
after an oil price shock, the reallocation of capital and labor is slow and costly due to search and 
matching issues. Costly sectoral reallocation would thus amplify the negative impact of a real oil 
price increase on economic activity, while mitigating the positive effect of a real oil price 
decrease. Further, the dispersion hypothesis of Lilien (1982) states that sectors that use oil as an 
input witness a decline further contributing to the sectoral imbalances created by coordination 
failures between firms (Huntington 2000). 
The next explanation involves the impact of heightened uncertainty about future oil 
prices on consumption and investment decisions. That is, in the wake of an oil price increase, 
uncertainty regarding the future price of crude oil would cause individuals to abstain from 
purchasing energy-intensive consumer durables such as automobiles. Similarly, uncertainty 
regarding the future price of oil would cause investors to postpone their purchases of capital 
goods (see for instance Bernanke, 1983, Dixit and Pindyck, 1993, and Pindyck, 1991). Hence, 
heightened uncertainty would also amplify the recessionary effect of an oil price increase and 
mitigate the expansionary impact of an oil price decrease. Finally, a theoretical justification for 
the presence of asymmetries relies on the asymmetric response of the monetary authorities to oil 
price increases and decreases. In particular, in the case of the U.S., it has been argued that the 
Federal Reserve responds more aggressively to rises in crude oil prices than it does to falls (e.g., 
Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997). Yet, empirical evidence regarding the role of monetary 
policy in amplifying the recessionary effect of oil price shocks is rather weak (see, e.g., Hamilton 
and Herrera, 2004; Herrera and Pesavento, 2009; and Kilian and Lewis, 2010). Fourth, there is 
empirical evidence that shows that petroleum product prices, in particular, gasoline, increase 
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more quickly in response to oil price increase than they fall when oil price decrease. (Bacon 
1991, Balke, Brown, and Yücel 1998) 
However, recent work by Kilian and Vigfusson (2010a) has called into question the view 
that oil price shocks have an asymmetric effect on U.S. real GDP. In particular, they show that 
the methodology used in most of the empirical literature to assess the possible asymmetry in the 
effect of oil price shock on economic activity leads to inconsistent estimates and overestimates 
the magnitude of the effect. They also show that for a shock of the typical magnitude a 
symmetric model appears to provide a very good approximation to the response of U.S. real 
GDP growth to a shock in the real price of oil. They argue that the estimation methods used in 
VAR studies of the macroeconomic effect of oil price innovations generally produce inconsistent 
estimates of the true effects of unanticipated increases in the price of oil due to the censoring 
applied to the oil price variable. More importantly, such tests do not address the question of 
interest for most researchers and policy analysts. That is, whether the response of economic 
activity to oil price innovations, say a year after a shock, is or is not symmetric. 
In light of these methodological insights, this paper re-evaluates the evidence in favor of 
an asymmetric response in economic activity using a sample of 18 industrialized economies. It is 
essential to look at different countries since an oil shock may have a differential impact on each 
of the countries due to different sectoral composition, their relative position as oil importer or 
exporter or their differential tax structure (Cunado and Gracia 2005). In addition, there seems to 
have been a lack of non-US studies especially the ones that deal with the endogeniety issue of oil 
prices (Jones, Leiby and Paik (2003)). Additionally, increase in oil price volatility may directly 
affect terms of trade volatility (Backus and Crucini, 2000) which may affect each country 
differently especially since these countries vary in terms of their dependence on oil as an input 
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and dependence of foreign oil. Oil price increases worsen terms of trade for oil importing 
countries (Dohner 1981). It may be important to note that the role of oil prices on business cycles 
may be a function of, say, per-capita energy consumption (Engemann, Kliesen, Owyang 2010). It 
might be especially important to look at the impact of oil prices on economic activity in 
European countries since Europe is an important second largest consumer, the largest importer of 
oil and since the 1970s countries like U.K. and Norway have become large oil producers as well. 
It is also a region that has reduced its dependence on oil (Lardic and Mignon 2006). Similarly, 
Canada is included in our sample since it is one of the few net exporters of natural resources 
amongst the OECD countries with natural resource exports being around 24% for the early 
2000s. Even though oil and gas industry is less than 5% of GDP energy intesive industries are a 
big part of Canada's GDP. In addition, Japan is considered since it is the world's second largest 
economy, third largest oil consumer, and second largest oil importer (Zhang 2008). More than 
ever, it is important to compare responses of net oil exporters to net oil importers. Net oil 
exporters face an interesting trade-off in response to an oil shock; while there is a terms-of-trade 
improvement, energy intensive industries can be adversely affected along with a negative effect 
on the demand for labor and capital. 
We investigate the three leading specifications of asymmetric and possibly nonlinear 
feedback from the real price of oil to U.S. industrial production: the percent increase 
specification of Mork (1989) and the 1-year and 3-year net oil price increase specifications of 
Hamilton (1996, 2003). We carry out the impulse response based test proposed by Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2010a). In the full sample and for a typical one standard deviation innovation, we 
found evidence of asymmetry in the response for about half of the countries when we use the real 
oil price increase. Evidence of asymmetry is slightly stronger when we use the net oil price 
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increase relative to the previous one-year maximum; but it is considerably weaker when we use 
the net oil price increase relative to the previous three-year maximum. Evidence of asymmetry is 
more prevalent for a large (i.e., two standard deviation) innovation. Nevertheless, the evidence of 
asymmetry is considerably weakened when we restrict the sample to the post-1973 period. 
Amongst net oil exporters evidence of an overall positive response to an oil price increase is only 
found for Denmark. We also conduct tests to uncover evidence in favor of a time varying 
relationship between log growth of industrial production and the real price of oil for a large 
number of countries. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data; 
Section 3 discusses slope based tests, Section 4 presents the impulse response based tests; 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
To investigate the relationship between oil price shocks and economic activity we use 
monthly data on oil prices and industrial production indices for 18 OECD countries and 3 
country groups. Because macroeconomic models of the transmission of oil price shocks are 
typically specified in terms of the price of imported crude oil (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2010), we 
use the Refiners Acquisition Cost --hereafter RAC-- for crude oil imported into the U.S. and 
reported by the Energy Information Agency.
4
 
However, Hamilton (2010) finds that Producer Price Index for crude petroleum better relates to 
prices consumers pay for gasoline for the 1970s than the West Texas Intermediate or the refiner 
                                                 
4
 One may argue that we should use the U.K. Brent price as it better represents the price faced by European 
importers. However, whereas the RAC price is available at a monthly frequency since January 1974, the U.K. Brent 
spot price is only available starting on January 1997. Furthermore, the correlation between the spot U.K. Brent spot 
price and the RAC price for imported crude oil is 0.995. 
34 
 
 
 
acquisition cost. In order to compute a measure of the price faced by consumers and investors in 
each country we multiply the RAC price by the exchange rate and deflate it by each country's 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Both the exchange rate and the CPI for each country is provided by 
International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. The base year for the CPI 
data is 2005. For country groups such as OECD-Europe, OECD-Total, and G7, the real price of 
oil is calculated using the U.S. CPI. 
For countries that switched to the Euro after 1998, a conversion factor provided by the 
IFS of the International Monetary Fund is used to adjust the exchange rate. This is done in order 
to maintain historical continuity. Data for euro-area countries have been converted to national 
currency by applying the official irrevocably fixed Euro/national currency conversion rates to 
years after the introduction of the Euro. Data for Germany are linked at 1991 to data that pertain 
to the former West Germany. 
We use three different nonlinear transformations of the logarithm of the real oil price,   . 
The first of these measures is Mork's (1989) oil price increase, which can be defined as: 
   
     {         }                                                         (1) 
This censoring of the oil price series was proposed by Mork (1989) after the 1985-86 fall in oil 
prices failed to lead to a boom in real GDP growth. He thus showed that whereas oil price 
increases preceded an economic recession; in contrast, he could not reject the null hypothesis 
that declines did not lead to expansions. Subsequently, Hooker (1996) and Kilian and Vigfusson 
(2011), among others, showed that this result vanishes in longer samples. 
The second measure used in our paper is the net oil price increase over the previous 12-
month maximum (Hamilton, 1996) 
  
      {         {              }                                                         (2) 
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and the last one is the net oil price increase over the previous 36-month maximum (Hamilton, 
2003) 
   
      {         {              }                                                         (3)                                                       
The last two nonlinear transformations are intended to filter out increases in the price of oil that 
represent corrections for recent declines, and have been commonly used in the literature on the 
macroeconomic effects of oil prices (see for instance Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997; Davis 
and Haltiwanger, 2001; Lee and Ni, 2002). Note, however, that in the text we report the results 
for the nonlinear transformations of the log of the real oil price. 
 
3. Slope Based Test 
Since the large hikes in the price of oil during the 1970s, both academics and policy 
makers have considered crude oil prices as one of the main sources of fluctuations in economic 
activity. Nevertheless, linear models of the transmission of oil price shocks had not been very 
successful in explaining large fluctuations in U.S. real activity. This appears to be also the case 
for other industrialized countries such as the G-7 economies. This fact has stimulated interest in 
models of an asymmetric and possibly nonlinear relationship between the real price of oil and 
real economic activity. In fact, since the seminal work of Mork (1989), there appeared to be a 
consensus suggesting that oil price increases lead to economic recessions whereas oil price 
decreases did not lead to booms. Thus, most of the literature on the response of economic 
activity to oil price innovations considered the response to be asymmetric. 
Three main theoretical explanations for an asymmetric response have been put forward in 
the literature: costly reallocation of capital and labor, increased uncertainty, and asymmetries in 
the systematic response of monetary policy. These three transmission channels are thought to 
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amplify the recessionary effect of an oil price increase and to mitigate the expansionary impact 
of an oil price decrease. In fact, evidence of asymmetry in the oil price-economic activity 
relationship has been commonly used in the literature to explain why the effect of oil price 
increases on GDP (gross domestic product) growth is not bounded by the share of energy in the 
value added (see Hamilton, 2008). 
Then, the relevant query is: how do we assess whether the effect of real oil price 
increases and decrease on economic activity is asymmetric? Since the seminal work of Mork 
(1989), it has been common in the literature to answer this question by implementing a test of 
asymmetry in the slopes. The test is usually carried out in the following manner. First, the 
researcher estimates a reduced-form equation: 
        ∑   
 
          ∑   
 
       
                                            (4) 
where     denotes economic activity growth (e.g., GDP growth or the growth in the Industrial 
Production index),   
  is a non-linear measures of real oil prices (e.g.,   
    
     
     as described 
in the previous section),    is the residual, and p the number of lags is set to 12 months or 
another lag length chosen by an information criterion. A Wald-test is then used to evaluate the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of the oil variable,   
 , are jointly equal to zero; 
that is, γ₁=γ₂=...γp=0. If the null is rejected, then it is common to conclude that lags of real oil 
prices are informative for future economic activity. Moreover, rejection of the null is seen by 
many researchers as evidence that real oil price increases do lead economic recessions. 
Suppose we followed this path and evaluated the effect of real oil prices on industrial 
production by using the above described slope based test. For instance, let us consider the effect 
of real oil price increases,   
 , on industrial production growth,   . Then, using   
 , we would 
conclude that lags of the real oil price increase are informative about the growth of industrial 
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production in the Netherlands, the U.S., the G-7, OECD-Europe, Greece and Spain. Note that for 
those countries we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of the real oil price 
measure are jointly significant as the p-values for the F-test are equal or less than 0.05 (see the 
first column of Table 2). Using the net oil price increase with respect to the previous 12-month 
maximum,   
  , would lead to a higher number of rejections. The p-values reported in the second 
column of Table 3 are less or equal to 0.05 for Canada, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, U.K., 
U.S., Spain, the G-7, and OECD-Europe. The test results using the net oil price increase relative 
to the previous 36-month maximum are very similar (see third column of Table 2), thus leading 
researchers to conclude that increases (or net increases) in the real oil price lead to recessions. 
Kilian and Vigfusson (2010a) propose a more powerful test of the null of symmetric 
slopes. They suggest estimating a more general model of the oil price-macroeconomy 
relationship where: 
         ∑      
  
         ∑      
  
          ∑      
  
       
                                 (5)     
Note that, in contrast with the regression model in (1), here contemporaneous values of 
the real oil price change,   , and of the non-linear measure of real oil prices,   
   enter the 
economic activity equation (2a). More importantly, lags of the real oil price change are also 
included as explanatory variables in the equation for economic activity. In addition, equation 
(2b) puts in evidence the effect of past growth in economic activity and past real oil price 
changes on the current economic activity growth. 
Now, to test for asymmetry in the slopes, one would only have to estimate the economic 
activity equation. Then, one would test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the lags of the 
non-linear measure of real oil prices are all equal to zero. That is,                .  
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How does our view of the effect of real oil price increases on economic activity change if 
we implement this slope based test? The p-values reported in the second panel of Table 2 suggest 
that our conclusions would change only slightly. There is an increase in the p-value for OECD-
Europe and Spain, which would lead one to conclude that the oil price-economic activity 
relationship is linear. In contrast, real oil price increases now appear to have predictive power for 
industrial production growth in Canada, Japan, Norway, U.K., and OECD-Total. Similar results 
are obtained when we use the net oil price increase with respect to the 12 or 36-month maximum 
(see columns 5 and 6 of Table 2). All in all, this more general test provides more evidence of 
asymmetry in the slope. In fact, using the net oil price increase relative to the past 36-month 
maximum would suggest that net oil price increases have predictive power for industrial 
production growth in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Japan, Sweden, U.K., U.S., Greece, Spain, 
the G-7, OECD-Europe and OECD-Total. 
But, what can we really learn from this slope test? While the test results might be 
informative regarding the presence of asymmetry in the slope of the industrial production 
equation, Kilian and Vigfusson (2010a) demonstrate that evidence of asymmetry in the slopes is 
not informative about the degree of asymmetry in the response of economic activity to an 
unexpected real oil price shock. The reason is that the impulse response functions needed to 
assess the degree of asymmetry in the response of economic activity, say 6 months or a year after 
an unexpected increase in the real crude oil price, are not only a function of the slope coefficients 
but also of other variables. As Kilian and Vigfusson (2010b) note "standard slope-based tests for 
asymmetry based on single-equation models are neither necessary nor sufficient for judging the 
degree of asymmetry in the structural response functions, which is the question of ultimate 
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interest to users of these models." For that reason, in what follows, we follow a different avenue 
to explore the response of industrial production to real oil price innovations. 
 
4. Impulse response function based test 
This paper looks at the relationship between oil prices and industrial production for 
several countries. We extend the work done by Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) by testing for 
nonlinearity in the oil price-industrial production relationship. In other words we test whether oil 
price increases have the same impact as oil price decreases. We start conducting impulse 
response based tests for a general vector autoregressive (hereafter VAR) model. We start by 
using Mork's (1989) measure of oil prices that ignores oil price decreases. In addition, we use 
Hamilton's (1996, 2003) net oil price increase measures of oil prices that filter out not only 
decreases in the price but also increases that corrected for previous declines. 
Consider estimating by OLS the following simultaneous equation model 
       ∑      
  
         ∑      
  
                                        (6a)                                                       
         ∑      
  
         ∑      
  
          ∑      
  
       
                                    (6b)                                                         
 
and then tracing the response of industrial production for a particular country,      to an 
unexpected one unit increase in the price of oil at time t=1, 
     
    
 at horizons t=1,2,...h. Because 
this response function is a nonlinear function of the parameters                        .  
as well as of the other parameters in (6), rejecting the null of symmetry in the slopes is not 
enough to conclude that the response of industrial production to oil price increases and decreases 
at horizon h is asymmetric. Moreover, computing this impulse response requires the researcher 
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to take into account both the recent history of the censored variable   
  and the magnitude of the 
shock    .
5
 
To avoid this problem we compute the impulse response based test proposed by Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2011). That is, we first compute impulse response functions for a given horizon, h, 
that take into account the size of the shock, δ, as well as the recent history of all the variables, 
       . Then, we compute the Wald test of the null of symmetric response functions (i.e., the 
response of industrial production to a positive shock of size δ equals the negative of the response 
to a negative shock of the same size, -δ): 
                                   
 
4.1 Real Prices 
We report the p-values for the impulse response based test using real prices in Tables 3 to 
14. We first evaluate the response of industrial production to a one standard deviation shock to 
real oil price increases,   
    
  . For a typical one standard deviation shock, we find statistical 
evidence against the null of a symmetric response for 10 of the 18 countries. Note that the p-
values reported in Table 9 are equal or lower than 0.05 for at least one horizon for Canada, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, UK, US, and Greece. In addition, 
evidence of asymmetry is also found for the aggregates (i.e., G-7, OECD-Europe, and OECD 
Total). The finding of asymmetry for Norway contradicts results from Mork, Olsen, and Mysen 
(1994) who do not find any evidence of asymmetry. 
Instead, when we consider the net oil price increase relative to the previous 12-month 
maximum,   
    
  we find evidence of asymmetry for Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, 
                                                 
5
 This problem has been long recognized in the econometrics literature. See for instance Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen, 
1993, and Koop, Pesaran and Potter, 1996. 
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Luxemburg, Sweden, UK, US, Greece, and Spain and the country aggregates (see Table 10). 
However, in contrast with the results obtained for the real oil price increase, no evidence of 
asymmetry is found for Germany, Netherlands, and Norway. Similar, but somewhat weaker 
results are obtained for the net oil price increase relative to the previous 36-month maximum, 
  
    
    see Table 11). In particular, p-values of 0.05 or lower are only observed for Canada, 
Japan, U.K., Greece, Spain, the G-7, and OECD-Total. These results seem to fall in line with 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2009), who using a sample starting in 1972, find evidence of 
asymmetry in the response of GDP growth for net oil exporters such as Norway and the U.K. and 
net oil importers such as the U.S. 
Evidence of asymmetry is more prevalent for a large two standard deviation shock (see 
Tables 11-13). Note, that we reject the null of a symmetric response at a larger number of 
horizons for Canada, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, U.K., and OECD-Total using the real oil 
price increases,   
    
    Evidence of asymmetry is found for more horizons for a larger number 
of countries using the net oil price increase relative to the previous 12-month maximum,  
  
  
  . In addition, p-values of 0.05 or lower are now found for Austria and Belgium. Yet, 
regardless of the oil price measure, no evidence of asymmetry is found for France, Portugal, and 
Denmark. 
Summarizing, our test results would suggest that, for only slightly more than 50% of the 
countries, there is asymmetry in the response to positive and negative innovations of the typical 
one standard deviation magnitude. Therefore, real oil price innovations might be mainly 
transmitted to the economy via the decrease in the purchasing power of households that now face 
a higher price of imported oil. Evidence of asymmetry one year after a typical innovation is 
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found for Canada, Japan, Luxemburg, Greece, Norway, and the U.S.; yet, the results are not 
consistent across oil price measures. 
An important point to note here is that we consistently find evidence in favor or both 
asymmetry and nonlinearity for Japan which confirms results from Zhang (2008) but are 
contradictory to the result found by Jimenez--Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004). However, as far as 
UK is concerned, our results are in line with Jimenez--Rodriguez and Sanchez (2004) who find 
evidence of asymmetry for UK one year after the shock. These results support the possibility of a 
Dutch disease phenomenon described earlier. 
Interestingly, while the tests results are consistent for most of the G-7 nations in that they 
either reject or fail to reject the null of symmetry, there is no clear pattern pointing towards a 
particular functional form for the largest developed countries. On one hand, we reject the null of 
symmetry for Canada, the U.S., the U.K., and Japan. On the other hand, for France, Germany, 
and Italy it appears that a linear model would suffice to capture the transmission of unanticipated 
real oil price innovations to industrial production, especially for capturing the response of 
industrial production to a small shock in oil prices. Similarly, there is no clear pattern separating 
net oil exporters from net oil importers. For instance, take the cases three net oil exporters: 
Canada, Denmark and Norway. Regardless of the oil price measure, there is evidence of 
asymmetry at a 10% level in the response to a typical innovation for Canada. However, we 
always fail to reject the null of symmetry for Denmark and we reject the null of symmetry only 
for the real oil price increase in the case of Norway for both typical and large shocks. 
 Nevertheless, our results suggest that caution should be exercised when computing the 
effect of a large real oil price shock (e.g. a two standard deviation shock) as, after a year, the 
response of about 70% of the countries shows evidence of asymmetry. Thus, both the size of the 
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shock and the past history of the variables need to be taken into account when computing the 
magnitude of the effect. For a large innovation, costly sectoral reallocation and heightened 
uncertainty appear to play a role in the transmission of real oil price shocks. 
 
4.1.1 The effect of dropping pre-1974 data 
In the previous section we explored the question of asymmetry using the longest data set 
available for each country. Therefore, for all the countries but Denmark and the country group, 
OECD-Total, the data spans a period that starts in the 1960s. However, it has been argued (see 
Kilian and Vigfusson, 2010, 2011 and Herrera, Lagalo and Wada, 2011) that the transmission 
mechanism of real oil price innovations could have changed in the 1970s, at least for the U.S. In 
fact, the Texas Railroad Commission largely set world oil prices between the 1930s and 1960s, 
but was displaced by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973. Since 
then, nominal oil prices have become more flexible and responsive to world market conditions. 
Therefore, in this section, we discuss the results obtained when we restrict the sample to the post-
1973 period. The p-values for the impulse response based tests on this smaller sample are 
reported in Tables 3-8. 
As it can be seen on Tables 3-5, for the typical one standard deviation shock, we find 
evidence of asymmetry for at least one horizon in only seven countries (Canada, Finland, 
Germany, Japan, U.S., Norway, and Greece), the G-7, and OECD-Total using the real oil price 
increase,   
    
    In particular, for countries such as Italy, Netherlands, and U.K., all the p-
values exceed 0.05 in the smaller sample, whereas we were able to reject the null for at least one 
horizon in the full sample. Evidence of asymmetry is even weaker when we use the net oil price 
increase with the number of rejections being smaller   
    
   than for   
    
    Moreover, 
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regardless of the oil price measure, one year after the shock, the response of industrial production 
to typical real oil price innovations appears to be linear for all countries. 
As it is the case in the full sample, Tables 6-8 reveal more evidence of asymmetry in the 
response of industrial production to a large shock (i.e. two standard deviations) than to a typical 
shock (i.e., one standard deviation). Using the real oil price increase we can reject the null of 
symmetry for at least one horizon for Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Norway, U.K., U.S., Greece, the G-7, and OECD-Total (see Table 12). The number of countries 
for which we get rejections increases slightly if we use the net oil price increase over the 12-
month maximum; we find asymmetry to large innovations, for at least one horizon, for 11 
countries. Yet, the evidence in favor of asymmetry is considerably weakened when we use the 
net oil price increase over the 36-month maximum; for at least one horizon, we reject the null of 
symmetry at a 5% significance level only for Luxemburg, Sweden, U.S., U.K., Greece, Spain, 
and OECD-Total. Yet, we fail to reject the null for most countries at the one year horizon. These 
results are consistent with Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) and Herrera, Lagalo and Wada (2011) 
who find that the evidence of asymmetry in the oil price-economic activity relationship for the 
U.S. is weakened when the pre-1974 data is dropped. 
 
4.1.2 Data Mining 
One concern with interpreting evidence of asymmetry for a particular country as evidence 
of asymmetry for the industrialized countries in general is that there is an element of data mining 
involved. That is so because we have conducted 21 Wald tests for each oil price measure. As 
mentioned in Herrera, Lagalo and Wada (2010), conventional critical values do not account for 
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repeated applications of the IRF based test to alternate IP indices, in this case the alternate IP 
indices being IP indices for different countries. 
6
 
To address this concern we simulate the null distribution of the supremum of the bootstrap test 
statistic across all countries for each of the oil price measures. The critical values that account for 
data mining are based on 100 pseudo series generated using the estimated coefficients for the 
subsample that covers 19 country indices for the full sample and 21 indices for the 1974-2010 
subsample. For each series, we use 100 replications to obtain the conditional IRFs and 100 
bootstraps to get the test statistic.Test statistics that are significant at 5% and 10% level are 
denoted by ** and *, respectively, in Tables 3-14. 
As expected, accounting for data mining reduces the number of rejections. Using the the 
net oil price increase measure with respect to 36 month maximum and a typical shock, evidence 
of asymmetry is found only for Greece at the 10% level. Using one month max measure and the 
net oil price increase measure with respect to 12 month maximum we now find evidence of 
nonlinearity for no countries. The results using a large shock are much different; evidence of 
asymmetry is no longer found for any country using any of the three oil price measures. 
When we consider the full sample and use a typical shock, we find evidence of 
nonlinearity for Canada, Japan, UK, and Greece using the net oil price increase with respect to 
12 month maximum at the 5% level. Using the net oil price increase with respect to 36 month 
maximum, we find evidence of nonlinearity for Canada, G7, and Greece. for at least two 
horizons. In the previous subsection, we find evidence of nonlinearity for all three oil price 
measures for several countries. However, once we account for data mining we only find evidence 
                                                 
6
 See Inoue and Kilian(2004) and Kilian and Vega (2010) for the effect of data mining and solutions to the problem 
of data mining in the related context of tests of predictability. 
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of a nonlinear relationship between oil prices and industrial production for the U.S. for 1 horizon 
using the net oil price increase with respect to 12 month maximum. 
 
4.2 Impulse Response Plots 
But, how big is the difference between the response to positive and negative shocks? To 
illustrate the magnitude of this distance Figures 1a-1c  and Figures 2a-2c plot the responses 
        and           to a typical shock (one standard deviation) and large shock (2 standard 
deviation) respectively for the post 1973 subsample. Figures 3a-3c and 4a-4c plot the responses 
for a typical and large shock for the full sample. Note that to facilitate the comparison, we plot 
the response to a positive shock,        , and the negative of the response to a negative shock, 
         . The responses are measured in percentages and the horizontal axis represents 
months after the shock. 
 
4.2.1 Full Sample 
As can be seen in Figures 3a-3c the responses to a small shock look very similar. 
Differences are noticeable for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Sweden, 
UK, and US after one year of the shock for the real oil price increase. For instance, at h=12 the 
value of the response to a positive shock,        for the total IP is between 2% and 12 times 
larger than the response to a negative shock,          . When using the net oil price increase  
with respect to 12-month maximum the ratio between positive to negative response is bigger than 
1 for 10 countries, 1 year after the shock. For instance, for h=12, the ratio of positive to negative 
response ranges between 1.05 to 3.16 depending on the country. Lower evidence of asymmetry 
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is found after one year for the net oil price increase with respect to 36 month maximum measure 
with only 6 countries where the ratio between positive to negative response is greater than 1. 
For a large shock at h=12, the countries for which we find evidence of asymmetry using 
the IRF based tests, the ratio of the positive to negative response, 
       
       
, ranges from 1.08 for 
Finland to 5.90 for the U.S. For the response to a net oil price increase measures, the ratio of the 
positive to negative response, 
       
       
, ranges from 1.02 to 3.53. 
A few points are worth mentioning here. First, for the real oil price increase and a small 
shock, noticeable differences are observed between positive and negative response for net oil 
exporters at short horizons. The ratio of positive to negative response ranges from 5.20 to 19.85 
for the net oil exporters Denmark, UK, Norway, and Canada. Second, for a large shock using the 
real oil price increase, the response to  a negative shock is 78 times than that to a positive shock 
for Norway at h=12. Third, for a large shock using the net oil price increase with respect to the 
12 month maximum, the response to a positive shock is about 3-4 times than that to a negative 
shock for Denmark and the UK  for mid-horizons h=6 and h=7. Similar differences are observed 
for the net oil exporters at h=2,6,7 using the net oil price increase with respect to 36 month 
maximum. Fourth, both positive and negative shocks are found to be recessionary one year after 
the shock for Austria using a large shock for all three measures of oil price. Fifth, all results for 
the UK which is a net oil exporter point out that a year after the shock, an increase in oil prices 
leads to a fall in industrial production whether we consider a typical or a large shock and 
irrespective of the oil price measure used. These results propose the possibility of a Dutch 
disease phenomenon suggested in the literature. 
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4.2.2 Post 1973 Sample 
Having shown that there is very little statistical evidence of asymmetry, the question that 
comes to mind is: when there is asymmetry, how big is the difference between the response to a 
positive and a negative innovation? Consider the cases of Canada, Japan and the U.S. where we 
find evidence of asymmetry using the real oil price increase. In these countries, an unexpected 
increase in real crude oil prices of one standard deviation would lead to roughly a 0.1% drop in 
industrial production a year after the shock. For Canada, this recessionary effect would be 34% 
larger than the expansionary effect of a negative shock of the same magnitude. The effect of a 
positive shock would be 8% and 17% larger than the effect of a negative shock for Japan and the 
U.S., respectively. Instead, our estimates suggest that for Norway a decrease in the price of oil 
has a recessionary effect on industrial production that is almost three times as large as the 
expansionary effect of an unexpected increase in the price of crude oil. 
Departures from symmetry appear to be economically smaller, and sometimes negligible, 
for the net oil price increase. For instance, when we use the net oil price increase over the 
previous 12-month maximum, for the typical one standard deviation shock the ratio of the 
positive to the negative response for Canada, Japan and the U.S. are 1.15, 0.99 and 1.03, 
respectively. The ratio for Norway is considerably smaller if we use the net oil price increase 
instead of the price increase. A decrease in oil prices would only result in roughly a 14% larger 
decrease in industrial production than the expansionary effect of an oil price increase of the same 
size.   
Not surprisingly, departures from symmetry are of greater magnitude for a large shock. 
For the oil price increase the ratio of the positive to negative responses are 2.10, 1.23, and 1.87 
for Canada, Japan and the U.S., respectively. For instance, our estimates for Canada suggest that, 
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after a year, a large increase in the price of crude oil would result in a 0.21% fall in industrial 
production whereas the same size decrease in the price of oil would lead to a 0.1% expansion. 
A few interesting points are worth noting: For net oil exporters such as Denmark and 
Canada the response to a typical size positive shock is as high as 74 times and 14 times 
respectively (at horizon 8 and 7) than that of a negative shock of the same magnitude for the real 
oil price increase. Similarly, when we use the net oil price increase over the previous 36-month 
maximum, for Denmark the response to a positive shock is 28 times the response to a negative 
shock immediately after the shock. For a large shock, similar differences are observed for the net 
oil exporters, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the UK, with the response to a positive shock 
being between 3 times to 40 times larger than the response to a negative shock when using the 
real oil price increase. Differences are also observed for Denmark when using the net oil price 
increase measures, although the ratios of positive to negative responses are smaller. We find 
evidence in favor of a possibility of a Dutch disease phenomenon for the UK after a positive oil 
price shock due to a real exchange rate appreciation of the pound since amongst all countries the 
largest accumulated decline occurs for UK when using the net oil price increase measures and 
for Norway when using the one month max measure for both a typical shock and a large shock 
(The latter result is in contrast to the results obtained by Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) 
and Mork, Olsen, and Mysen (1994) who find the overall response of Norway to an oil shock to 
be positive). The accumulated response of Canada's IP to oil price increases is also negative but 
much smaller in magnitude. This result is different from Dissou (2010) who find that oil shocks 
can have a positive impact on Canada using simulation results. However, Rasche and Tatom 
(1981) had observed that neither UK nor Canada experienced an increase in aggregate demand 
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after the 1979-80 oil price increase. The only net oil exporter that has an overall positive 
response to an oil price increase is Denmark. 
These results suggest that it might be useful to compare the magnitude of net oil exports 
per capita across countries as suggested by Engemann, Kliesen, and Owyang (2010) whose 
results show that there is a tendency for countries with low oil exports per capita to have a larger 
probability of a recession due to an oil price increase. Alternately, one might want to consider the 
magnitude of net oil exports over GDP for different countries as suggested by Bruckner, 
Ciccone, Tesei (2011) who find that countries with a bigger net oil exports over GDP ratio see 
improvements in democratic institutions as a result of an oil price shock. It might also be useful 
to study the export intensity of energy intensive sectors in net oil exporting countries in order to 
determine the negative impact of an oil price increase on the economy. Issues such as the degree 
of diversification and inter-industry relationships along with government's policy response might 
be vital in determining the existence of a Dutch disease phenomenon especially since it may not 
be possible to distinguish between the Dutch disease phenomenon and a general economic slow 
down caused by high oil prices (Dissou 2010). 
Another interesting point to be noted is that during several instances, both a positive 
shock and a negative shock in the oil price are found to be recessionary. These results are in line 
with the theory that oil-induced reallocations proposed by Loungani(1986) and Hamilton (1988) 
can be recessionary irrespective of whether they are caused by an oil price increase or decrease 
(Mory 1993). For instance, for a typical shock evidence of a recessionary impact through both a 
positive and a negative shock in oil price is found for 12 countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, US, Greece, Spain, and 
Denmark) and 1 country group (G7) for at least one horizon when using the real oil price 
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increase. In addition, both positive and negative shocks in oil price are found to be recessionary 
for at least one horizon for Denmark irrespective of the oil price measure used.  However, no 
such evidence is found for Japan and Sweden irrespective of the oil price measure used. This 
evidence of a recessionary effect in response to both a positive and a negative shock is found to 
be even stronger when the shock is large. For example, all countries and country aggregates 
show evidence of a decline in industrial production for at least one horizon because of both a 
positive and a negative shock in oil price when using the oil price increase measure. However, no 
such evidence is found for Norway and Japan when using either of the net oil price increase 
measures. The largest accumulated decline to a decrease in oil prices is observed for Finland for 
both a typical (.6% to .7 %) and a large shock (1.68% to 1.8%) and for all oil price measures. 
We also find that the response of certain countries like Luxemburg, Netherlands, and 
Norway's industrial production to a typical shock is, in general, bigger in magnitude compared to 
responses of other countries. For example, in response to a typical size oil price increase, using 
the one month max measure, one month after the shock we find that Luxemburg's IP goes down 
by .40% while for most other countries the response varies between .09% to .2%. Similarly, in 
response to a large shock, Luxemburg's IP goes down by 1.18% one month after the shock while 
the response of most other countries remains under .65% in magnitude. This result is similar to 
that of Cunado and Gracia (2003) who find that Luxemburg is more vulnerable than the rest of 
the countries to oil price changes. Similarly, Engemann, Kliesen and Owyang (2010) find 
Norway to be the most responsive to oil shocks. 
In light of the above results, let us consider a question closely related to the query at the 
opening of the previous section. Consider an industrialized country that faces a decrease in the 
real price of oil today. Should this country expect an increase in economic growth of the same 
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magnitude of the recession that it would experience in the face of a positive real oil price shock 
of equal size? The answer depends on the country and the size of the shock at hand. 
First, a structural change in the transmission mechanism of oil prices appears to have 
taken place in the early 1970s. As a result, in the post-1973 data, the response of industrial 
production to real oil price innovations is well approximated by a linear function for most OECD 
countries under consideration. For these countries, the expansionary effect of a real oil price 
decrease should be of similar magnitude as the recessionary effect of a real oil price increase. 
Second, for the few countries where there is some evidence of asymmetry (Canada, 
Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the U.S., and Greece), departures from symmetry range 
between 1.02 and 14 times for the typical one standard deviation innovation. For the large (two 
standard deviation) and infrequent innovations, the recessionary effect of a positive real oil price 
shock can be twice as large as the expansionary effect of a negative shock. 
Finally, the fact that we find the largest (though still small) number of rejections for the 
real oil price increase suggest that costly reallocation of capital and labor and heightened 
uncertainty may play a role in the transmission of oil innovations for countries such as Canada, 
Japan, Norway, the U.S., and Greece. Now, whether the disparity across countries responds to 
differences in the costs of shifting capital and labor across sectors, differences in the effect of 
uncertainty on investment and consumption of durable goods, and/or differences in monetary 
policy across countries is an important topic of research that will have to be addressed in the 
future. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper revisits a question that has been extensively studied in the literature on the oil 
price-macroeconomy literature: is the oil price-macroeconomy relationship linear? Using a data 
53 
 
 
 
set on industrial production for 18 OECD countries and 3 country groups we find ample 
evidence of asymmetry in the slopes. Consistent with the extant literature, we find more evidence 
of asymmetry for the net oil price increase than for Mork's (1989) real oil price increase. 
Yet, the premise that slope based test are enough to quantify the degree of asymmetry in 
the response of economic activity to real oil price innovations has been recently questioned by 
Kilian and Vigfusson (2011). They argue that the estimation methods used in VAR studies of the 
macroeconomic effect of oil price innovations generally produce inconsistent estimates of the 
true effects of unanticipated increases in the price of oil due to the censoring applied to the oil 
price variable. More importantly, such tests do not address the question of interest for most 
researchers and policy analysts. That is, whether the response of economic activity to oil price 
innovations, say a year after a shock, is or not symmetric. 
Hence, in this paper we carry out the impulse response based test proposed by Kilian and 
Vigfusson (2011). In the full sample and for a typical one standard deviation innovation, we find 
evidence of asymmetry in the response for about half of the countries when we use the real oil 
price increase. Evidence of asymmetry is slightly stronger when we use the net oil price increase 
relative to the previous one-year maximum; but it is considerably weaker when we use the net oil 
price increase relative to the previous three-year maximum. Evidence of asymmetry is more 
prevalent for a large (i.e., two standard deviation) innovation. In that case, we reject the null of a 
symmetric response for about 80% of the countries in the sample for at least one horizon. 
Nevertheless, the evidence of asymmetry is considerably weakened when we restrict the 
sample to the post-1973 period. In other words, for most countries, nonlinearity in the response 
of industrial production to a typical real oil price shock is likely due to the inclusion of the period 
when the Texas Railroad Commission set world oil prices. In fact, we fail to reject the null at a 
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one year horizon for all the countries in the sample and all the oil measures. For a large 
innovation, we still find some statistical evidence of asymmetry in the response to real oil price 
shocks, especially when we use the net oil price increase with respect to the previous 12-month 
maximum. 
Our results suggest that a linear model is a good approximation for the response of 
industrial production to a typical real oil price innovation for the 18 OECD countries in the 
sample at most --but not all horizons. Some exceptions are Canada, Finland, Japan, Norway, 
Sweden, the U.S., and Greece where we reject the null of symmetry for at least one horizon. 
Departures from symmetry for a typical one standard deviation shock are of some economic 
significance for Canada, Japan, Norway and the U.S. 
The fact that evidence of asymmetry is more prevalent for large innovations suggests that 
care must be taken in computing impulse response functions that correctly account for the 
nonlinearity of the oil price-industrial production relationship when considering these large (two 
standard deviation) but infrequent shocks. However, conventional critical values reported in our 
tables do not account for repeated applications of the IRF based test to various countries or 
alternative horizons and, thus, are likely to overstate the evidence in favor of asymmetry (see, 
e.g., Herrera, Lagalo and Wada, 2011). 
In brief, there appears to be very limited evidence in favor of asymmetry in the response 
of industrial production to real oil price increases and decreases for the 18 OECD countries 
under analysis. Furthermore, different non-linear specifications lead to different results across 
countries, thus making it difficult to match the empirical results with a particular theoretical 
explanation for asymmetry in the transmission of oil price shocks. Future work will be needed to 
understand whether the disparity across countries responds to differences in the importance of 
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the various transmission channels related to the composition of the economy and, especially, to 
the role that oil plays in each country (e.g., whether the country is a net oil importer or a net oil 
exporter). 
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Table 1. Country List and Sample Period 
Country Sample period 
Austria 1961:2010:7 
Belgium 1961:2010:7 
Canada 1961:2010:7 
Finland 1961:2010:7 
France 1961:2010:7 
Germany 1961:2010:7 
Italy 1961:2010:7 
Japan 1961:2010:7 
Luxemburg 1961:2010:7 
Netherlands 1961:2010:7 
Norway 1961:2010:7 
Portugal 1961:2010:7 
Sweden 1961:2010:7 
UK 1961:2010:7 
US 1961:2010:7 
G7 1961:2010:7 
OECD-Europe 1961:2010:7 
Greece 1962:2010:7 
Spain 1965:2010:7 
Denmark 1974:2010:7 
OECD-Total 1975:2010:7 
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Table 2. Slope based test of nonlinearity 
 Forecasting Equation Structural Equation 
Sector   
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
     
  =   
    
  =   
     
  =   
   
Austria 0.27 0.31 0.11 0.33 0.21 0.04 
Belgium 0.25 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.02 
Canada 0.16 0 0 0.01 0 0 
Finland 0.07 0.26 0.17 0.51 0.88 0.71 
France 0.39 0.32 0.18 0.67 0.65 0.44 
Germany 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.53 0.1 0.11 
Italy 0.51 0.08 0.02 0.48 0.13 0.05 
Japan 0.08 0.02 0 0 0.01 0 
Luxemburg 0.81 0.17 0.73 0.93 0.1 0.66 
Netherlands 0 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.29 
Norway 0.37 0.71 0.5 0 0.77 0.62 
Portugal 0.42 0.13 0.21 0.79 0.22 0.44 
Sweden 0.47 0.11 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.02 
UK 0.06 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 
US 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 
G7 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD-Europe 0.05 0 0 0.11 0 0 
Greece 0.02 0.28 0.03 0 0.01 0 
Spain 0.02 0 0 0.42 0 0 
Denmark 0.29 0.44 0.42 0.06 0.24 0.14 
OECD-Total 0.94 0.22 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 
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Table 3. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
 ) - post 1973 
subsample 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.33 0.44 0.26 0.39 0.53 0.38 0.5 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.45 
Belgium
@
 0.34 0.43 0.52 0.58 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.81 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.74 
Canada
#
 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.2 0.27 0.3 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.27 
Finland
@
 0.91 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.2 0.28 0.31 0.4 0.37 0.38 0.41 
France
@
 0.2 0.38 0.51 0.41 0.27 0.36 0.32 0.3 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.3 0.37 
Germany
@
 0.81 0.4 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.37 0.45 0.53 
Italy
@
 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.2 0.28 0.37 0.44 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.33 0.3 
Japan
@
 0.39 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.25 
Luxemburg
#
 0.94 0.1 0.16 0.26 0.23 0.31 0.4 0.5 0.61 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.88 
Netherlands
@
 0.65 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.25 0.32 0.4 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.25 0.26 
Norway
#
 0.19 0.2 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.14 0.19 
Portugal
#
 0.52 0.77 0.19 0.32 0.44 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.63 0.71 0.79 0.82 0.82 
Sweden
@
 0.36 0.59 0.19 0.32 0.37 0.49 0.6 0.61 0.69 0.73 0.74 0.6 0.62 
UK
#
 0.45 0.65 0.12 0.12 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.17 0.22 0.3 0.37 0.45 0.49 
US
#
 0.38 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.19 
G7
#
 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.17 
OECD-
Europe
@
 
0.37 0.53 0.23 0.34 0.47 0.59 0.67 0.61 0.56 0.65 0.73 0.71 0.61 
Greece
@
 0.1 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.34 
Spain
#
 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.59 0.72 0.82 0.88 0.87 0.31 0.32 0.39 0.44 0.36 
Denmark
@
 0.93 0.56 0.33 0.49 0.6 0.65 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.76 0.43 0.44 0.51 
OECD-Total
#
 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.25 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =  
   ) - post 1973 
subsample 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.25 0.2 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.36 0.46 0.57 0.59 0.54 0.6 0.65 0.72 
Belgium
@
 0.13 0.24 0.38 0.41 0.49 0.62 0.71 0.62 0.71 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.88 
Canada
#
 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.3 0.13 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.34 
Finland
@
 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.2 0.27 0.16 0.11* 0.12* 0.16 
France
@
 0.06 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.21 0.3 0.37 0.46 0.55 0.61 0.62 0.7 
Germany
@
 0.39 0.55 0.65 0.8 0.89 0.86 0.91 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.96 
Italy
@
 0.07 0.12 0.24 0.35 0.46 0.45 0.5 0.56 0.66 0.74 0.77 0.83 0.84 
Japan
@
 0.25 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.44 0.48 
Luxemburg
#
 0.55 0.67 0.77 0.42 0.52 0.64 0.73 0.63 0.72 0.63 0.71 0.78 0.84 
Netherlands
@
 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.47 0.58 0.63 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.96 0.96 
Norway
#
 0.99 0.99 1 0.9 0.72 0.8 0.77 0.73 0.77 0.83 0.89 0.88 0.91 
Portugal
#
 0.72 0.62 0.71 0.84 0.84 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.99 1 1 
Sweden
@
 0.04 0.12 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.44 0.48 0.57 0.64 0.64 0.68 
UK
#
 0.56 0.43 0.29 0.43 0.57 0.69 0.79 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.96 
US
#
 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.43 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.58 0.67 0.65 0.72 
G7
#
 0.08 0.14 0.27 0.41 0.46 0.39 0.51 0.58 0.66 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.87 
OECD-Europe
@
 0.45 0.3 0.48 0.63 0.74 0.79 0.86 0.84 0.9 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 
Greece
#
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.23 0.27 0.36 0.43 0.49 0.58 0.65 
Spain
#
 0.66 0.14 0.25 0.39 0.45 0.56 0.5 0.6 0.68 0.76 0.8 0.85 0.85 
Denmark
@
 0.74 0.94 0.85 0.87 0.45 0.56 0.44 0.43 0.52 0.6 0.61 0.52 0.6 
OECD-Total
#
 0.04 0.09 0.18 0.28 0.36 0.37 0.49 0.59 0.61 0.7 0.77 0.84 0.88 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =  
   ) - post 1973 
subsample 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.48 0.68 0.32 0.43 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.59 0.68 0.72 0.8 0.85 0.9 
Belgium
@
 0.21 0.34 0.48 0.56 0.34 0.42 0.4 0.45 0.55 0.61 0.7 0.77 0.83 
Canada
#
 0.11 0.27 0.45 0.61 0.69 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.77 0.7 0.77 0.84 0.87 
Finland
@
 0.43 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.74 0.82 0.89 0.93 0.95 0.9 0.93 0.96 0.96 
France
@
 0.34 0.63 0.58 0.62 0.74 0.71 0.65 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.97 
Germany
@
 0.6 0.76 0.83 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Italy
@
 0.46 0.65 0.76 0.86 0.9 0.94 0.86 0.8 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.96 0.98 
Japan
@
 0.5 0.58 0.71 0.84 0.8 0.77 0.82 0.51 0.57 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.78 
Luxemburg
#
 0.11 0.29 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.56 0.66 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.92 0.95 
Netherlands
@
 0.3 0.45 0.43 0.51 0.65 0.76 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.96 
Norway
#
 0.99 0.79 0.91 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.82 0.75 0.82 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.92 
Portugal
#
 0.75 0.94 0.76 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.64 0.73 0.8 0.83 0.88 0.91 
Sweden
@
 0.5 0.6 0.17 0.27 0.3 0.31 0.37 0.24 0.11* 0.15 0.15* 0.20* 0.18* 
UK
#
 0.24 0.13 0.22 0.35 0.49 0.62 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.81 0.83 0.88 0.91 
US
#
 0.96 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.31 0.3 0.29 0.32 0.39 0.46 0.54 0.55 
G7
#
 0.17 0.38 0.52 0.68 0.81 0.84 0.62 0.71 0.75 0.63 0.62 0.7 0.7 
OECD-Europe
#
 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.29 0.42 0.54 0.66 0.48 0.58 0.68 0.61 0.69 0.75 
Greece
#
 0.02* 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.4 0.51 0.62 0.72 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.92 
Spain
#
 0.47 0.03 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.33 0.42 0.51 0.6 0.65 0.66 0.73 
Denmark
@
 0.47 0.75 0.84 0.87 0.8 0.81 0.73 0.66 0.74 0.81 0.84 0.89 0.92 
OECD-Total
#
 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.5 0.37 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.56 0.65 0.72 
 Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. IRF based test of symmetry to 2 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
 ) - post 1973 
subsample 
 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.3 0.42 0.2 0.3 0.43 0.25 0.34 0.36 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 
Belgium
@
 0.31 0.35 0.44 0.48 0.62 0.6 0.61 0.46 0.56 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.43 
Canada
@
 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Finland
@
 0.91 0.11 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 
France
@
 0.21 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.2 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.15 
Germany
@
 0.81 0.38 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.12 
Italy
@
 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Japan
@
 0.39 0.03 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxemburg
#
 0.94 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.3 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.62 
Netherlands
@
 0.66 0.1 0.12 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.33 0.39 0.37 0.05 0.06 
Norway
#
 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Portugal
#
 0.49 0.74 0.14 0.24 0.35 0.46 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.68 0.69 
Sweden
@
 0.34 0.56 0.13 0.22 0.29 0.38 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.55 0.52 0.27 0.26 
UK
#
 0.42 0.62 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.14 
US
#
 0.4 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
G7
#
 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD-Europe
@
 0.37 0.5 0.19 0.28 0.41 0.52 0.62 0.56 0.48 0.57 0.66 0.62 0.55 
Greece
@
 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 0 
Spain
#
 0.19 0.27 0.35 0.51 0.65 0.77 0.84 0.79 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.15 
Denmark
@
 0.93 0.59 0.3 0.45 0.56 0.6 0.42 0.5 0.61 0.64 0.19 0.21 0.24 
OECD-Total
#
 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². 
Bold and italics denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote 
whether the impulse response to a positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative 
shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after accounting for data mining at the 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. IRF based test of symmetry to 2 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
   ) - post 1973 
subsample 
Horizon              
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.15 0.11 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0 0 0 0.01 
Belgium
@
 0.11 0.18 0.28 0.27 0.35 0.47 0.52 0.12 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.14 
Canada
#
 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.02 
Finland
@
 0.01 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0 
France
@
 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
Germany
@
 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.6 0.69 0.65 0.75 0.4 0.49 0.54 0.63 0.55 0.61 
Italy
@
 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.1 0.13 0.11 0.13 
Japan
@
 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 
Luxemburg
#
 0.5 0.59 0.65 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 
Netherlands
@
 0.44 0.39 0.3 0.09 0.1 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.3 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.34 
Norway
#
 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.65 0.76 0.62 0.59 0.64 0.72 0.78 0.64 0.67 
Portugal
#
 0.66 0.43 0.45 0.61 0.46 0.58 0.69 0.52 0.58 0.67 0.71 0.77 0.82 
Sweden
@
 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 
UK
#
 0.51 0.32 0.11 0.13 0.21 0.3 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.47 0.3 0.21 0.16 
US
#
 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
G7
#
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD-Europe
#
 0.32 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.27 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.11 
Greece
@
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Spain
#
 0.64 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.18 0.27 0.08 0.1 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.16 
Denmark
@
 0.74 0.94 0.84 0.88 0.3 0.34 0.27 0.24 0.32 0.31 0.15 0.18 0.18 
OECD-Total
#
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. IRF based test of symmetry to 2 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
   ) - post 1973 
subsample 
Horizon              
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.95 0.93 0.18 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.3 0.35 0.39 0.48 0.54 0.62 
Belgium
@
 0.24 0.39 0.48 0.62 0.37 0.48 0.38 0.22 0.22 0.2 0.22 0.2 0.22 
Canada
#
 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.29 0.36 0.43 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.6 0.59 0.51 
Finland
@
 0.4 0.64 0.58 0.73 0.46 0.59 0.7 0.73 0.74 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.42 
France
@
 0.25 0.51 0.33 0.29 0.42 0.35 0.17 0.19 0.26 0.31 0.32 0.39 0.44 
Germany
@
 0.55 0.54 0.57 0.64 0.77 0.67 0.73 0.54 0.58 0.66 0.61 0.68 0.63 
Italy
@
 0.25 0.36 0.48 0.62 0.7 0.79 0.48 0.25 0.34 0.41 0.49 0.33 0.4 
Japan
@
 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.31 0.27 0.1 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09 
Luxemburg
#
 0.06 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.29 0.32 0.32 
Netherlands
@
 0.23 0.38 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.2 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.38 
Norway
#
 0.99 0.71 0.86 0.9 0.96 0.97 0.46 0.4 0.49 0.56 0.62 0.56 0.64 
Portugal
#
 0.73 0.91 0.73 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.94 0.15 0.2 0.24 0.3 0.37 0.45 
Sweden
@
 0.51 0.7 0.24 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.26 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.03 
UK
#
 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.13 0.06 0.02 
US
#
 0.98 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.25 0.29 
G7
#
 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.55 0.58 0.45 0.34 0.38 
OECD-Europe
#
 0.11 0.27 0.21 0.32 0.42 0.53 0.61 0.28 0.2 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.24 
Greece
@
 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.2 0.27 0.32 0.25 0.3 
Spain
#
 0.53 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.17 
Denmark
@
 0.44 0.71 0.82 0.82 0.69 0.56 0.51 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.33 0.37 0.31 
OECD-Total
#
 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.28 0.19 0.2 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.39 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
      
 )- full sample 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.2 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.33 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.22 
Belgium
#
 0.47 0.45 0.26 0.08 0.14 0.2 0.2 0.27 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.41 
Canada
@
 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.18 0.2 0.07 
Finland
#
 0.91 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12 
France
#
 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.41 0.34 0.45 0.52 0.6 0.62 0.71 0.63 0.67 0.63 
Germany
@
 0.88 0.19 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.1 0.14 0.14 0.15 
Italy
#
 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.3 0.13 0.15 
Japan
#
 0.45 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxemburg
#
 0.5 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.2 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.21 
Netherlands
#
 0.99 0.11 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.1 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.16 
Norway
@
 0.1 0.2 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Portugal
#
 0.32 0.41 0.29 0.44 0.49 0.55 0.67 0.65 0.72 0.8 0.8 0.81 0.85 
Sweden
#
 0.3 0.31 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.34 0.44 0.48 0.56 0.65 0.53 0.27 
UK
@
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 
US
#
 0.27 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
G7
@
 0.03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
OECD-
Europe
#
 
0.11 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.09 
Greece
#
 0.33 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Spain
@
 0.89 0.31 0.16 0.25 0.36 0.48 0.55 0.57 0.6 0.68 0.59 0.67 0.66 
Denmark
@
 0.93 0.56 0.33 0.49 0.6 0.65 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.76 0.43 0.44 0.51 
OECD-Total
#
 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.25 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
     
   )- full sample 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria# 0.44 0.71 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.2 0.29 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.33 0.4 
Belgium@ 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.24 
Canada@ 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
Finland@ 0.15 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.08* 0.09* 
France@ 0.21 0.23 0.39 0.32 0.3 0.22 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.57 0.49 0.55 0.6 
Germany# 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.26 0.36 0.45 0.26 0.3 0.24 0.3 0.26 0.32 
Italy@ 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.2 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.29 0.31 0.39 
Japan# 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01** 0.01* 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03* 0.05** 
Luxemburg@ 0.57 0.22 0.39 0.23 0.33 0.43 0.54 0.51 0.49 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.27 
Netherlands@ 0.91 0.44 0.3 0.19 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.54 0.58 0.6 0.65 
Norway# 0.85 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.37 0.33 0.38 
Portugal@ 0.17 0.08 0.1 0.14 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.48 0.57 0.42 0.46 
Sweden@ 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.2 0.24 0.3 0.32 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.51 
UK@ 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 0.01** 0.02* 0.03* 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.17 
US# 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.25 0.14 0.17 
G7@ 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.22 
OECD-Europe@ 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.39 0.37 0.46 0.33 0.41 0.49 0.52 
Greece# 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.01** 
Spain@ 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.2 0.24 0.28 0.33 0.41 0.49 0.55 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 11. IRF based test of symmetry to 1 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
   )- full sample 
Horizon              
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.47 0.62 0.47 0.63 0.32 0.43 0.55 0.58 0.66 0.64 0.72 0.72 0.79 
Belgium
@
 0.12 0.3 0.38 0.35 0.19 0.2 0.24 0.32 0.41 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.47 
Canada
#
 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04
** 
0.05
** 
0.01
** 
0.01
** 
0.01
** 
0.01
** 
0.02
** 
0.01
** 
Finland
@
 0.8 0.82 0.26 0.33 0.47 0.59 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.87 
France
@
 0.72 0.47 0.37 0.45 0.54 0.65 0.75 0.82 0.84 0.82 0.47 0.52 0.51 
Germany
#
 0.18 0.31 0.42 0.58 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.85 0.9 
Italy
@
 0.31 0.11 0.22 0.35 0.46 0.54 0.37 0.46 0.55 0.64 0.72 0.7 0.76 
Japan
#
 0.25 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.3 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.43 
Luxemburg
@
 
0.96 0.43 0.55 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.5 0.58 0.52 0.43 0.32 0.33 0.35 
Netherlands
@
 
0.62 0.46 0.52 0.26 0.38 0.49 0.61 0.69 0.76 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.82 
Norway
#
 0.83 0.94 0.87 0.91 0.73 0.79 0.66 0.6 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.85 0.87 
Portugal
@
 0.65 0.68 0.86 0.92 0.78 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.65 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.84 
Sweden
@
 0.36 0.65 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.34 0.38 0.46 0.47 0.55 0.6 0.66 0.73 
UK
#
 0.00
** 
0.01
* 
0.02
* 
0.03 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.2 0.24 0.3 
US
@
 0.62 0.33 0.15 0.26 0.38 0.47 0.54 0.65 0.68 0.55 0.6 0.25 0.15
* 
G7
@
 0.36 0.03 0.03
* 
0.06 0.08 0.1 0.06
** 
0.08 0.11
* 
0.12 0.17 0.19 0.10
** 
OECD-
Europe
@
 
0.45 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.24 0.26 0.34 0.43 0.41 0.35 0.38 0.34 0.38 
Greece
#
 0.00
* 
0.00
** 
0.00
** 
0.01
** 
0.02
** 
0.03
** 
0.04
** 
0.04
** 
0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.09
* 
0.13
* 
0.14
* 
Spain
@
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.38 0.4 0.46 0.53 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 12. IRF based test of symmetry to 2 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
 )- full sample 
 Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
@
 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.2 0.26 0.18 0.2 0.24 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.08 
Belgium
@
 0.49 0.48 0.28 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.23 
Canada
@
 0.18 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.01 
Finland
#
 0.92 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 
France
#
 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.28 0.38 0.41 0.49 0.53 0.62 0.49 0.51 0.46 
Germany
@
 0.89 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Italy
#
 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.27 0.22 0.3 0.18 0.21 0.27 0.08 0.08 
Japan
@
 0.51 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxemburg
#
 
0.52 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 
Netherlands
#
 
0.99 0.11 0.15 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Norway
@
 0.11 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal
#
 0.34 0.43 0.27 0.4 0.41 0.43 0.54 0.43 0.46 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.66 
Sweden
#
 0.33 0.34 0.07 0.13 0.2 0.26 0.35 0.45 0.5 0.57 0.65 0.47 0.21 
UK
@
 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 
US
#
 0.34 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 
G7
#
 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD-
Europe
#
 
0.15 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.1 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.03 
Greece
@
 0.35 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain
@
 0.89 0.28 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.42 0.21 0.28 0.25 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 13. IRF based test of symmetry to 2 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
   )- full sample 
Horizon 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
#
 0.47 0.75 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.26 0.35 0.22 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 
Belgium
@
 0.1 0.25 0.28 0.37 0.31 0.28 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
Canada
#
 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.03 0 0 0 0.01 0 
Finland
@
 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0 
France
@
 0.26 0.25 0.42 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.3 0.39 0.49 0.5 0.25 0.32 0.15 
Germany
#
 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.26 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.05 
Italy
@
 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Japan
#
 0.12 0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Luxemburg
#
 0.59 0.29 0.46 0.24 0.35 0.47 0.58 0.53 0.46 0.32 0.21 0.28 0.16 
Netherlands
@
 0.91 0.44 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.01 0 
Norway
#
 0.87 0.62 0.52 0.56 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.2 0.26 0.14 0.19 
Portugal
@
 0.2 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.14 
Sweden
@
 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.01 0 0.01 
UK
@
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
US
#
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00** 0.00* 
G7
@
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00* 0 
OECD-Europe
@
 0.03 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
Greece
#
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain
@
 0.02 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock, respectively.** and * denote significance after 
accounting for data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 14. IRF based test of symmetry to 2 s.d. shock to the real oil price (  
  =   
   )- full sample 
Horizon              
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Austria
#
 0.52 0.66 0.38 0.52 0.27 0.32 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.29 0.33 0.27 0.14 
Belgium
@
 0.17 0.38 0.44 0.38 0.18 0.2 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.06 
Canada
#
 0.07 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 
Finland
@
 0.78 0.74 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.2 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 
France
@
 0.74 0.58 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.71 0.75 0.71 0.56 0.06 0.08 0.03 
Germany
#
 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.2 0.29 0.39 0.37 0.21 0.25 0.33 0.31 0.02 0.03 
Italy
@
 0.25 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Japan
#
 0.21 0.06 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 
Luxembur
g
@
 
0.93 0.46 0.53 0.27 0.35 0.44 0.55 0.63 0.52 0.48 0.4 0.22 0.13 
Netherlan
ds
@
 
0.63 0.46 0.4 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.2 0.23 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.12 0.04 
Norway
#
 0.81 0.93 0.81 0.85 0.43 0.46 0.33 0.3 0.38 0.46 0.55 0.48 0.52 
Portugal
@
 0.61 0.46 0.64 0.73 0.53 0.44 0.47 0.22 0.25 0.32 0.32 0.26 0.33 
Sweden
@
 0.36 0.65 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.04 
UK
#
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
US
@
 0.1 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0 0 
G7
@
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
OECD-
Europe
@
 
0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 
Greece
@
 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Spain
@
 0 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
    Notes: Tests are based on 1000 simulations of model (6). p-values are based on the χ_{H+1}². Bold and italics 
denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. # and @ denote whether the impulse response to a 
positive shock was bigger or smaller than that to a negative shock.** and * denote significance after accounting for 
data mining at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1a: Impulse Response to a one standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real price of oil 
(percentage): Post 1973 subsample. 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 1b: Impulse Response to a one standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real price of oil 
(percentage): Post 1973 subsample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 1c: Impulse Response to a one standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real price of oil 
(percentage): Post 1973 subsample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 2a: Impulse Response to a two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real price of oil 
(percentage): Post 1973 subsample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 2b: Impulse Response to a two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Post 1973 subsample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 2c: Impulse Response to a two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Post 1973 subsample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 3a: Impulse Response to a one standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Full sample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 3b: Impulse Response to a one standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Full sample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 3c: Impulse Response to a one standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Full sample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 4a: Impulse Response to a two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Full sample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 4b: Impulse Response to a two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Full sample. 
 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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Figure 4c: Impulse Response to a two standard deviation positive and negative shocks to the real 
price of oil (percentage): Full sample. 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the VAR in (6) where the number of replications to obtain IRFs equal 1000.  
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CHAPTER 3 SEPARATING DEMAND AND SUPPLY SHOCKS IN THE OIL MARKET 
— AN ANALYSIS USING DISAGGREGATED DATA1 
1. Introduction 
The weaker response of the economy to oil price increases in the 2000s led to the 
question of whether oil should be treated as exogenous or endogenous. A large number of 
authors in recent years have looked at what Nordhaus(2007) describes as "the surprising oil non-
crisis" that followed the oil price increase of 2003-2008.
2
 
This branch of the oil price shock literature further addresses the issue of studying the nature of 
the underlying oil shock. Lippi and Nobili (2010) show that the relationship between oil price 
shocks and US business cycles depends on whether the shocks are oil supply shocks, global 
supply shocks, US supply shocks, or global demand shocks. Similar results have been confirmed 
by Balke, Brown and Yücel (2010) who through their use of Bayesian methods with DSGE 
models identify sources of oil price shocks (Also see, Barsky and Kilian (2004), and Kilian 
(2008a)). 
Regardless, until recently, the common approach in the literature that analyzes the oil 
price-macroeconomy relationship has been to treat the change in the price of oil as exogenous. 
However, Kilian (2009) treats oil prices as endogenous and decomposes the price of oil into 
three components: oil supply shocks, shocks to the aggregate world demand for industrial 
commodities, and demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. According to the 
                                                 
1
 I thank Ana María Herrera for her immense guidance and help. I am grateful to Lutz Kilian for his comments and 
data. I also thank seminar participants at Georgia State University, Emory University, University of Michigan, and 
University of North Carolina- Charlotte for helpful comments and suggestions. 
2
 Herrera and Pesavento (2009), Blanchard and Gali (2008), Edelstein and Kilian (2007) among others explain the 
difference seen in the 2000s by citing increased global financial integration, greater flexibility, smaller shocks, better 
monetary response, reduced energy intensity and increased experience as some of the reasons. 
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author, the last component reflects precautionary demand. The paper examines the importance of 
each of these components in determining the real price of oil and concludes that policies that deal 
with higher oil prices should look at its underlying determinants. 
Unlike the traditional idea that crude oil supply disruptions drive the real price of oil, 
Kilian (2009) concludes that crude oil production changes only cause a small and temporary 
increase in the real price of oil. On the other hand, he finds that both an increase in oil-specific 
demand and an increase in aggregate demand for world industrial commodities cause a 
substantial increase in the real price of oil. In addition, historical oil price decompositions also 
show that from 1973-2007, the real price of oil was mainly influenced by a combination of 
changes in aggregate demand for industrial commodities and oil-specific demand shock. These 
findings have an important implication on how changes in the real price of oil affect the U.S. 
economy. Since each of these shocks affect the real price of oil differently, they also have 
different impacts on the US economy. In addition, some of these shocks may have direct effects 
on the US economy and indirect effects through the real price of oil. 
This paper extends the work done by Kilian (2009) by examining the impact of demand 
and supply shocks in the crude oil market on 29 industrial production indices in the US. It has 
been argued that it is useful to consider disaggregated data while studying the relationship 
between oil prices and the macroeconomy as focusing on real aggregate GDP might hide the 
reallocative affects of capital and labor as a result of an oil price increase. In addition, the effect 
of different oil shocks on GDP maybe a weighted total of the effects on individual industries and 
simply analyzing the effects of oil shocks on an aggregate measure will ignore individual 
industry responses (Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada, 2011). Further, we examine both energy 
84 
 
 
 
intensive and non-energy-intensive industries since analysis in existing literature tends to focus 
only on energy intensive industries. 
This paper deals with several issues. First, we treat oil prices as endogenous. As shown 
by Balke, Brown and Yücel (2010), Barsky and Kilian (2004), Kilian and Vega (2009) and 
Kilian (2009) amongst others, oil prices should be treated as endogenous. Second, we determine 
the role of oil demand conditions and global macroeconomic conditions in defining the 
relationship between oil prices and industrial production. In particular, we examine the roles that 
oil supply shocks driven by political events, other oil supply shocks, demand shocks to industrial 
commodities, and oil-specific demand shocks play in explaining industrial production. Third, we 
attempt to find if demand shocks in the crude oil market matter more than supply shocks. Fourth, 
the paper analyzes if energy intensive sectors have a stronger response to oil shocks than non-
energy-intensive oil shocks. 
This paper looks at two different cases. In the first case, the global crude oil production 
measures the supply side effects. In contrast, the demand side effects are measured by the real 
price of oil and the Kilian index of global real economic activity (Kilian 2009) which is based on 
a global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates. In the second case, a measure of oil 
supply shocks driven by political events is explicitly included to further separate oil supply 
shocks from political events from other supply shocks. We find that impact of oil supply shocks, 
although significant for a few sectors, is not as important as that of aggregate demand shock and 
oil-specific demand shock. We also find that the effect of an aggregate demand shock, while 
positive and significant at first, eventually becomes negative. The oil-specific demand shock 
seems to be more important than other shocks since it leads to significant responses for more 
horizons and more sectors than the other shocks. We also find that there seem to be no clear 
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connection between energy intensity and the response of a sector to the structural oil shocks. 
Furthermore, inclusion of a political supply shock does not change our overall conclusion. 
Our results are in line with Kilian and Hicks (2010), Dvir and Rogoff (2010), and Kilian 
(2009), who show that demand side oil shocks contribute more to changes in U.S. 
macroeconomic aggregates than supply side oil shocks. However, our results also show that oil 
supply shocks may play a bigger role in determining industrial production in certain non-energy-
intensive sectors such as machinery, fabricated metal, and transit equipment. Similarly, 
aggregate demand shocks seem to play a more important role for sectors like nondurable 
consumer goods, paper products, chemical products, printing and related, and chemicals. It is 
also observed that the response of not all sectors is negative to some shocks. Several sectors have 
a positive and significant response to an aggregate demand shock. In addition, motor vehicles 
and consumer durables have a positive response to an oil supply shock. Our results also show 
that demand shocks do not have an impact on food and tobacco, food, beverage and tobacco, and 
paper. In short, we find that the impact of an oil price shock can be positive, negative, or 
insignificant depending on the sector and on the nature of the shock. In addition, our findings 
show that further research efforts need to focus on developing theoretical models that address the 
underlying nature of an oil shock. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data while Section 3 describes 
the methodology for both cases considered. The results are described in Section 4 and Section 5 
concludes. 
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2. Data 
We consider two different cases. In the first case we use the global crude oil production 
to measure the supply side effects, while the demand side effects are measured by the real price 
of oil and the Kilian index of global real economic activity (Kilian 2009). In the second case, the 
supply side effects are measured by: 1) a measure of oil price shocks due to political events 
proposed by Kilian (2008 a, b) and 2) the global crude oil production. The Kilian index on global 
real economic activity is based on a global index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates. It is the 
measure of the component of worldwide economic activity that drives demand for industrial 
commodities in world markets. The measure of oil price shocks due to political events is 
important to include since production of crude oil may be disrupted by wars and revolutions in 
the Middle East. This measure distinguishes between crude oil production changes caused 
directly by political events in OPEC countries and endogenous changes in production caused by 
changes in the real price of oil. 
Because macroeconomic models of the transmission of oil price shocks are typically 
specified in terms of the price of imported crude oil (Kilian and Vigfusson, 2010), we use the 
Refiners Acquisition Cost for crude oil imported into the U.S. The series is deflated using the 
U.S. CPI. Both the data on Refiners Acquisition Cost and global crude oil production are 
reported by the Energy Information Agency. The data for the Kilian index for economic activity 
is obtained from Kilian (2009) and that for the oil price shocks due to political events is obtained 
from Kilian (2008a). While the sample period considered for the first case is 1973.2 to 2007.12 , 
the one for the second case extends only until 2004.9 due to limited availability of the measure of 
oil price shocks due to political events. 
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The four series are plotted in Figure 1. The measure of oil price shock due to political 
events witnesses considerable fluctuation in late 1973 and early 1974 but remains flat until late 
1978 (see upper left panel of Figure 1). Further wild oscillations are seen in the early 1980s, 
early 1990s, and throughout the 2000s. The biggest fall is observed in November 1980 while the 
biggest increases are seen in 1974 and 1979. The growth rate of crude oil production is plotted in 
the upper right panel of Figure 1 and averages at 0.94. We first observe a large negative growth 
rate of crude oil production in November 1973, followed by October 1975 and January 1977; 
however, in the latter two cases it quickly recovers. The series is relatively less volatile in the 
1980s and the variability of the series further diminishes in the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Global real economic activity and the rate of growth of the real price of oil are plotted in 
the bottom left and right panels, respectively, of Figure 1. Global real economic activity goes 
through huge increases in late 1973/early 1974 and big declines in the mid 1980s. There is a 
further reduction in global real economic activity in the late 1990s. The rate of growth in the real 
price of oil is high throughout 1979-1984 and then starts declining, becoming negative by the 
mid 1980s. Barring some positive growth in the real price of oil in latter half of 1990, the rate of 
growth of the real price of oil remains negative throughout the 1990s, with a large decrease in 
1998-1999. 
To measure U.S. economic activity we use data on seasonally adjusted industrial 
production (IP) index for 29 sectors computed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
These indices include 5 aggregates and market and industry groups. Market groups comprise of 
products and materials. Products include aggregates such as consumer goods, equipment and 
nonindustrial supplies, whereas materials correspond to inputs used in the manufacturing of 
products. Industry groups include three digit NAICS industries. The period spanned by the data 
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is 1974.12 to 2007.12 and 1974.12 to 2004.9  for Case 1 and Case 2, respectively, depending on 
the availability of data on the oil market measures. 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the industries in our sample. The industries with 
the highest monthly average growth rates in our sample are durable consumer goods, 
manufacturing (SIC), chemical products, plastics and rubber products, motor vehicle, and 
manufacturing (NAICS) with monthly average growth rates ranging between 0.25% to 0.36% . 
The lowest average monthly growth rates are observed for clothing, apparel and leather goods, 
primary metal, fabricated metal product, machinery, transit equipment, textiles materials, and 
electrical equipment. The lowest monthly average growth rates range from -0.23% to 0.10% 
monthly growth rates. The growth rates for motor vehicles, motor vehicles and parts, transit 
equipment, and primary metal have a larger variance than that for other sectors. 
Table 2 shows energy intensity for selected NAICS industries. Energy intensity is 
calculated as the ratio of energy consumption (measured in Trillion Btu) to gross output 
(measured in Billion 2000 Dollars). Both series have been obtained from the Manufacturing 
Energy Consumption Survey (2006) of the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Our sample 
includes a mix of energy intensive and non-energy-intensive sectors. The sectors with the highest 
energy intensity are paper, petroleum and coal, chemicals, and primary metal. Other sectors that 
are energy intensive are food, beverage and tobacco, textiles and products, and total 
manufacturing.
3
 
The chemical industry is the largest energy consuming industry in the industrial sector. In 
2003, the chemical industry consumed 6.3 quadrillion Btu of energy. This number is expected to 
                                                 
3
 It is worth observing that the sectors with the high energy intensity have seen a significant decline in energy 
intensity over the years. While this may be in part due to redefinition of industries over the years due to the switch 
from SIC to NAICS, some may be attributed to improvements in efficiency (Issues in Focus, Annual Energy 
Outlook 2007). This is consistent with an overall decline in energy intensity of GDP. 
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grow to 7.5 quadrillion Btu in 2025. The chemical sector depends on natural gas and petroleum 
as material inputs and as fuel for heat and power (Issues in Focus, Annual Energy Outlook 
2007). Petroleum refining is the most energy intensive manufacturing industry in the U.S. The 
petroleum refining industry uses energy both to supply heat and power for plant operations and 
as a raw material for the production of petrochemicals and other non-fuel products 
(Manufacturing Energy Consumption Survey, Industry Analysis Briefs). 
It should be noted that most sectors with high average growth rates are also sectors that 
have high energy intensity either in terms of production or in terms of use. For example, while 
chemicals are energy intensive in terms of production, motor vehicles is a sector that is energy 
intensive in terms of use. However, some energy intensive sectors such as primary metal and 
textiles have some of the lowest monthly average growth rates in our sample. Nevertheless, most 
sectors that have the low energy intensity also have low average growth rates; examples include 
apparel and leather goods, fabricated metal product, machinery, and electrical equipment. 
 
3. Methodology 
While traditionally oil supply shocks have been deemed to be the factor driving oil 
prices, recent literature has shown a surprising result. Unanticipated oil supply disruptions have 
only a small transitory positive effect on the real price of oil (See Kilian (2009), Kilian and Park 
(2009), and Kilian and Lewis (2009)). In addition, new findings suggest that historically, oil 
supply shocks have contributed relatively little to changes in the real price of oil compared to oil 
demand shocks. Previous models of the oil-price macroeconomy relationship have treated oil 
prices as exogenous and being mainly influenced by oil supply shocks. 
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These findings make it necessitate an examination of how the U.S. industries are affected 
by each of this shocks. Demand and supply side oil shocks may have different impacts on the US 
industries through both direct effects and indirect effects through the real price of oil. Therefore, 
we extend the work done by Kilian (2009).by separating the effect of oil demand shocks from oil 
supply shocks on U.S. industrial production indices. We compute different structural shocks in 
the oil market and examine their impact on different IP indices. 
We look at two different cases. In the first case, the global crude oil production measures 
the supply side effects and the demand side effects are measured by the real price of oil and the 
Kilian index of global real economic activity (Kilian 2009). This case is discussed in Section 3.1. 
In the second case, a measure of oil supply shocks driven by political events is explicitly 
included in addition to the global crude oil production to measure the supply side effects. This 
case is discussed in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1 Case1: Separating demand shocks from supply shocks 
We use a structural VAR (vector autoregression) model of the global crude oil market 
that addresses issues related to both endogeniety and separation of supply and demand shocks. 
This structural VAR has been proposed by Kilian (2009) and includes 
                       where        is the percent change in global crude oil production, 
      denotes real economic activity, and      represents the real price of oil. The last two series 
are expressed in logs. 
We estimate the following structural representation: 
       ∑       
  
                                                             (1) 
where    denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. 
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The reduced form errors are decomposed as:   
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where O1, O2, and O3 refer to the 3 structural shocks: oil supply shock, shock to world 
aggregate demand for industrial commodities (hereafter referred to as an aggregate demand 
shock), and oil-specific demand shock respectively. This helps us determine what drives the 
price of oil and that further helps us in accurately predicting the implications of higher oil price 
on the economy. 
So in the next step, we estimate the effects of the above shocks on U.S. industrial 
production indices using the regression: 
        ∑   
 
                                                                  (3) 
where s=1,2,3 refers to the 3 structural shocks and       refers to growth rate of industrial 
production indices for i=1 to 29. 
The impulse response coefficients correspond to     for horizon h. The number of lags 
and the maximum horizon of the impulse response function are set at 36 months. The number of 
bootstrap replications used is 20000. 
 
3.2 Case 2: Separation of political supply shock and other supply shocks 
In order to separate oil supply shocks from the oil demand shocks, we now include 
another variable to represent the supply side. We specify a structural near-VAR model based on 
monthly data for                            where     denotes the series of oil supply 
shocks driven by exogenous political events in OPEC countries. 
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We estimate the following structural representation 
      
  ∑       
  
      
                                                        (4) 
 
  
where the first row of    has been restricted to zero, reflecting the exogeneity of     and its lack 
of serial correlation (see Kilian 2009 for further explanations) and    denotes the vector of 
serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. 
The reduced form errors are now decomposed as: 
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where O1, O2, O3, and O4 refer to political oil supply shock, other oil supply shock, aggregate 
demand shock, and oil-specific demand shock respectively. 
In the second step, the impact of monthly shocks on US industrial production indices is 
computed. 
       
  ∑   
  
         
    
                                                       (6) 
where s=1,2,3,4 refers to the 4 structural shocks. 
The impulse response coefficients correspond to     
 for horizon h. The number of lags 
and the maximum horizon of the impulse response function are set at 36 months. The number of 
bootstrap replications used is 20000. 
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4. Results 
Until recently oil supply shocks have been deemed to be the driving factor behind the real 
price of oil. However, findings in recent literature suggest that historically, oil supply shocks 
have contributed relatively little to changes in the real price of oil compared to oil demand 
shocks. Therefore, we examine how demand and supply side oil shocks have different impacts 
on 29 U.S. industries. 
The first case is discussed in Section 4.1. In the first case, the demand side effects are 
measured by the real price of oil and the Kilian index of global real economic activity (Kilian 
2009) and the supply side effects are measured by the global crude oil production. Section 4.1 
first discusses the impact of oil supply shocks, followed by the impact of aggregate demand 
shocks, and then oil-specific demand shock. We find that impact of oil supply shocks, although 
significant for a few sectors, is not as important as that of aggregate demand shock and oil-
specific demand shock. We also find that the effect of an aggregate demand shock, while 
positive and significant at first, eventually becomes negative. The oil-specific demand shock is 
more important than other shocks since it leads to significant responses for more horizons and 
more sectors than the other shocks. The results for the second case are discussed in Section 4.2. 
We find that the inclusion of a political supply shock does not change the overall results. 
 
4.1 Case 1: Separating demand shocks from supply shocks 
Figures 2a-2f present results for the first case. While the highest number of significant 
values arise from an oil-specific demand shock for most sectors, aggregate demand shocks and 
supply shocks matter more for some other sectors. In particular, supply side oil shock leads to 
significant responses for more horizons than other types of shocks for sectors such as machinery, 
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fabricated metal, transit equipment, paper materials, and paper. The impulse response functions 
to a supply side shock can be seen the first panel of Figures 2a-2f. Interestingly, while the 
response of machinery, fabricated metal, and transit equipment to a supply shock is significant 
for 32 months or more, the response of paper materials and paper is only significant for nearly a 
year. Note that, the former 3 sectors are low-energy-intensity sectors while paper is a high 
energy intensity sector. The response of machinery is found to be highly significant with 
significant values found for all horizons implied by the one standard deviation confidence band. 
In addition, the response of total index to a supply shock is significant for slightly more 
than two years. While Kilian (2009) found a negative and significant response from U.S. GDP 
for the first two years, our results indicate that the response of total index, while negative for all 
horizons, is significant for the first 8 months and horizons 15 to 31 as implied by the one-
standard-error bands. Additionally, total manufacturing (both SIC and NAICS) does not have 
significant response for all horizons during the first two years. On the other hand, the supply 
shock leads to hardly any significant response from sectors like foods and tobacco, clothing, 
paper products, chemical materials, motor vehicles and parts, foods, beverage and tobacco, 
printing and related, petroleum and coal, plastics and rubber, primary metal, and electrical 
equipment; the impulse response for these sectors is significant for 6 horizons or less. 
Similarly, aggregate demand shock seems to matter more than other shocks for sectors 
such as foods and tobacco, nondurable consumer goods, paper products, chemical products, 
food, beverage, and tobacco, printing and related, and chemicals. However, the response of foods 
and tobacco and food, beverage, and tobacco to an aggregate demand shock is significant for 
only 5 horizons. In this case the response of paper products, chemical products, printing and 
related, and chemicals is significant for 23 months or more. Three of these four sectors are 
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energy intensive sectors. The impact of the aggregate demand shock can be viewed in the middle 
panel of Figures 2a-2f. The sector with the highest number of horizons with significant responses 
is chemical products, with the number of significant horizons being 34. In addition, in contrast to 
the results for supply shock, the response of several sectors is significant for two or more years 
including total index, durable consumer goods, miscellaneous durable goods, manufacturing 
(SIC and NAICS), textile materials, textiles and products, plastics and rubber, electrical 
equipment, and motor vehicles. Moreover, the impulse response of sectors such as clothing, 
paper materials, motor vehicles and parts, and paper was not significant or only significant for 5 
or fewer months. 
The third panel of Figures 2a-2f shows the impact of an oil-specific demand shock. For 
17 sectors in our sample, oil-specific demand shocks lead to more significant responses than 
other shocks. These sectors include total index, clothing, durable consumer goods, miscellaneous 
durable goods, manufacturing (SIC and NAICS), textiles materials, chemical materials, motor 
vehicle and parts, textiles and products, apparel and leather, petroleum and coal, plastics and 
rubber, furniture and related, primary metal, electrical equipment, and motor vehicles. Of these, 
clothing, apparel and leather, petroleum and coal, primary metal, and electrical equipment are the 
only sectors with fewer than 30 horizons that have significant responses. In addition to the 17 
sectors, machinery and fabricated metal had a significant response to an oil-specific demand 
shock for 2 or more years. These results are in line with those found by Kilian (2009). However, 
an oil-specific demand shock fails to bring about a significant response from a few sectors 
including nondurable consumer goods, paper products, chemical products, transit equipment, 
food and tobacco, and food beverage and tobacco. For these sectors the response is significant 
for no horizons or only significant for 6 or fewer horizons. 
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A striking similarity is noted between results that we find for industrial production 
indices and the results found by Kilian and Park (2010) for industry stock returns for the sectors 
plastics and rubber, chemicals and paper. Both find that even though the energy intensity of 
plastics and rubber is far lower than that of chemicals, and paper, the impact of an oil-specific 
demand shock has a bigger impact on plastics and rubber than the other two sectors. Moreover, 
like us, they note that non-energy-intensive sectors such as machinery and electrical equipment 
have the same response as energy intensive sectors. These and other results in our paper show 
that there is no apparent relationship between energy intensity and the response of a sector. 
To summarize, there are 14 sectors for which few horizons (7 or fewer) have significant 
response as a result of a supply shock. These include food and tobacco, clothing, nondurable 
consumer goods, paper products, textiles materials, chemical materials, motor vehicle and parts, 
food beverage and tobacco, apparel and leather goods, printing and related support industries, 
petroleum and coal products, plastics and rubber products, primary metal, and electrical 
equipment. This is far greater than the number of sectors with little impact in response to an 
aggregate demand shock or an oil-specific demand shock. The former has a significant impact on 
fewer than 5 horizons in case of food and tobacco, clothing, paper materials, motor vehicle and 
parts, food beverage and tobacco, apparel and leather goods, and paper. Similarly, there are 7 
sectors for which oil-specific demand shocks have a significant impact on fewer than 8 horizons: 
food and tobacco, nondurable consumer goods, paper products, chemical products, transit 
equipment, food beverage and tobacco, and paper. Note that the sector food beverage and 
tobacco and the sector food and tobacco both do not have a significant impact in response to any 
of the shocks. 
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Also, note that petroleum and coal -which is highly energy intensive- is not significantly 
affected by supply side shocks. The impact of aggregate demand shock is positive and significant 
for about 1 year and the impact of an oil-specific demand shock is negative and significant for 
most horizons. This result again highlights that oil-specific shock is more important than other 
shocks. The results for the response of industrial production in petroleum and coal are different 
from the response of stock returns of the petroleum and gas industry estimated in Kilian and Park 
(2010). They find that the impact of an oil supply shock is negative and significant after the first 
7 horizons, the impact of an aggregate demand shock is positive and significant for all horizons, 
and that the oil-specific demand shock does not matter. 
 
4.1.1 Is the response of the IP indices positive or negative? 
A few points should be noted about the positive impact on the shocks, especially on 
energy intensive sectors and the broad aggregates in our sample. First, supply side shocks have a 
positive and significant effect from the fourth quarter of the second year on consumer durables 
and motor vehicles - sectors which are energy intensive by use. Second, the immediate impact of 
the aggregate demand shock on the aggregates is positive and then becomes negative for 
manufacturing (SIC and NAICS) and total index. In the beginning, a positive world demand 
shock has a positive impact on U.S. industries, but as increased world demand increases prices of 
industrial commodities, a negative impact occurs. Interestingly, while Kilian (2009) does not 
find the initial positive response of GDP to be significant, we find that immediate impact of the 
aggregates is positive as well as significant. This also holds true for sectors such as electrical 
equipment, fabricated metal, chemicals, textiles and products, textile materials, and 
miscellaneous durable goods. This result is different from that observed for other countries in 
98 
 
 
 
Lagalo (2011), where it is shown that while the response of total index in most countries is 
negative when significant as a result of a crude oil supply shock, the response of total index to an 
aggregate demand shock does not ultimately become negative. 
Third, the aggregate demand shock leads to an increased growth in industrial production 
for certain sectors, but unlike the previous group of sectors does not eventually lead to a decline. 
This group includes several energy intensive sectors such as chemical materials, motor vehicles 
and parts, petroleum and coal, and primary metal, as well as non-energy-intensive sectors such as 
machinery. Therefore, an aggregate demand shock is actually beneficial for these sectors. It is 
puzzling why an increase in prices of industrial commodities would not lead to a decrease in 
industrial production in these sectors. However, an oil-specific demand shock does have an 
initial positive impact followed by a negative and significant impact on machinery. 
Fourth, while the impact of certain oil shocks is positive on some sectors, other shocks 
may have a negative impact. This is noted for primary metal, petroleum and coal, chemical 
materials, machinery, and fabricated metal, where while the aggregate demand shock has a 
mostly positive and significant impact, other shocks may have either no impact or a negative 
impact. On the other hand, while supply shocks cause a positive and significant impact on motor 
vehicles and durable consumer goods, other shocks have a negative impact on these two sectors. 
Fifth, there are only two cases where a negative and significant impact of a shock is followed by 
a positive and significant response. As a result of a supply shock, both textiles and products and 
furniture experience this phenomena. However, the impulse response is only significant for ten 
or fewer horizons in both cases. 
There are several cases where the shocks lead to only a negative response from the 
sectors. Using a supply shock we find a negative and significant response from total index, 
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manufacturing (SIC and NAICS), chemical products, transit equipment, paper materials, 
fabricated metal, machinery, miscellaneous durable goods, and chemicals. As a result of an 
aggregate demand shock, a negative response is observed for durable consumer goods, 
nondurable consumer goods, paper products, chemical products, plastics and rubber, furniture, 
motor vehicles, and printing and related. In case of an oil-specific demand shock, a negative 
response is observed for 20 out of the 29 sectors (total index, clothing, durable consumer goods, 
miscellaneous durable goods, manufacturing (SIC and NAICS), textile materials, paper 
materials, chemical materials, motor vehicle and parts, textile and products, apparel and leather, 
chemicals, petroleum and coal, plastics and rubber, furniture, primary metal, fabricated metal, 
electrical equipment, and motor vehicles). These results are different from Lagalo (2011) where 
they find a negative and significant response for total index as a result of an oil-specific demand 
shock for only a handful of countries out of the 20 countries in their sample. In fact, they find 
that the response for some countries is actually positive and significant during the first year. 
 
4.2 Case 2: Separation of political supply shock and other supply shock 
Figures 3a-3f show the impulse response functions for Case 2 when political supply 
shocks are included. When political supply shocks are explicitly included, the oil-specific 
demand shock still leads to significant responses for more horizons for most sectors than any 
other shocks. This however, is not true for apparel and leather, foods and tobacco, and clothing. 
For these three sectors a political supply shocks results in a greater number of significant 
horizons than any other shock. In particular, both the response of apparel and leather and 
clothing is significant for 31 or more horizons as a result of a political supply shock. However, 
the number of horizons for which significant values are observed for foods and tobacco is only 3. 
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Chemical products, textile materials, textiles and products, chemical materials, and paper have a 
significant response to a political supply shock for at least 11 months. The remaining sectors 
have either no significant reaction or have a significant reaction for fewer than 6 horizons in 
response to a political supply shock. These results can be seen in the first panel of Figure 3a-3f. 
The response of other supply shocks is similar to that of total supply shocks in the 
previous subsection even when political supply shocks are included. The results for other supply 
shocks can be seen in the second panel of Figures 3a-3f. As a consequence of other supply 
shocks, more significant values are observed for transit equipment, paper materials, paper, and 
machinery than as a result of any other shock. While significant values are found for more than 
20 quarters for transit equipment and machinery, the sectors paper materials and paper have 
significant values for only 5 quarters. Like in the previous subsection, the response of total index 
to other supply shocks in significant for a little over two years. In addition, 8 sectors (fabricated 
metal, manufacturing (SIC), paper products, chemical products, chemical materials, chemicals, 
primary metal, manufacturing (NAICS)) have significant responses for at least a year in response 
to other supply shock. However, 13 sectors experience little (fewer than 7 significant horizons) 
or no impact as a result of other supply shocks. These include clothing, miscellaneous durable 
goods, nondurable consumer goods, motor vehicle and parts, food beverage and tobacco, textiles 
and products, apparel and leather goods, printing and related support industries, petroleum and 
coal products, plastics and rubber products, furniture and related products, electrical equipment, 
and motor vehicles. 
The response to aggregate demand shock is somewhat alike to that seen in the previous 
section with only 5 sectors that have a larger number of horizons with significant values than in 
response to other shocks (see panel 3 of Figures 3a-3f). These sectors include nondurable 
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consumer goods, paper products, chemical products, textiles materials, and chemicals. While the 
number of significant horizons for textiles materials is 32 months, that for paper products, 
chemical products, and chemicals is 2 years. However, nondurable consumer goods only have 
significant values for about a year in response to an aggregate demand shock. In addition, the 
response of total index, textiles and products, durable consumer goods, miscellaneous durable 
goods, manufacturing (SIC), plastics and rubber products, furniture and related products, 
fabricated metal product, machinery, and manufacturing (NAICS) to an aggregate demand shock 
is significant for at least two years. However, the response of foods and tobacco, food beverage 
and tobacco, printing and related, motor vehicle and parts, paper materials, and apparel and 
leather goods is only significant for 7 or fewer horizons. 
There are no significant differences in the response of IP indices to oil-specific demand 
shock in the two cases. There are 17 IP indices whose response has more significant horizons as 
a result of an oil-specific demand shock than other shocks (see last panel of Figures 3a-3f). This 
includes sectors that are energy intensive in terms of production (food, beverage and tobacco, 
petroleum and coal, primary metal, and chemical materials) and in terms of use (motor vehicles 
and motor vehicle and parts). This also includes aggregates such as manufacturing (SIC and 
NAICS), total index, durable consumer goods and miscellaneous durable goods and some non-
energy-intensive manufacturing sectors such as electrical equipment, fabricated metal product, 
plastics and rubber products, furniture and related products, printing and related support 
industries, and textiles and products. While the response of food, beverage, and tobacco is only 
significant for 4 months, the response of the remaining 16 sectors is significant for at least two 
years. In addition, there are 7 industries (clothing, textiles materials, paper materials, apparel and 
leather goods, paper, chemicals, and machinery) whose response is significant for at least 1 year. 
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There are very few sectors whose response to an oil-specific demand shock is significant for only 
a few months (foods and tobacco, nondurable consumer goods, paper products, and chemical 
products for 3 months or fewer). 
 
4.2.1 Is the response of the IP indices positive or negative? 
A few observations are made regarding the positive response of some IP indices. First, in 
response to a political supply shock, food and tobacco, nondurable consumer goods, food, 
beverage and tobacco, and chemical products have a positive and significant response. However, 
with the exception of chemical products, the positive response is significant only for a few 
horizons. Second, in response to other supply shocks, the response of durable consumer goods, 
motor vehicles, and motor vehicles and parts is mostly positive when significant; although the 
response of the latter two is significant only for a few horizons. While the response of paper 
products and primary metal is positive and significant for a few months during the first 6 
horizons, it becomes negative and significant thereafter. Third, there are seven sectors for which 
aggregate demand shocks lead to a positive and significant response during the first year; these 
are transit equipment, paper materials, chemical materials, motor vehicles and parts, paper, 
petroleum and coal, and primary metal. 
Additionally, there are 15 sectors (total index, miscellaneous durables, manufacturing 
(SIC and NAICS), textile materials, textiles and products, chemicals, plastics and rubber, motor 
vehicles, machinery, electrical equipment, fabricated metal, furniture and related, and durable 
consumer goods) for which the immediate response as a consequence of an aggregate demand 
shock is positive and significant; however, it becomes negative, especially by the third year. 
Fourth, an oil-specific demand shock brings about a positive and significant response during the 
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first six months from nondurable consumer goods, paper products, and food, beverage and 
tobacco, but it is only significant for fewer than 5 months. There are 16 other sectors whose 
response is positive and significant for a few months during the first 2 quarters. However, it is 
negative and significant during the second and third year for these sectors. Lastly, some sectors 
have a negative and significant response to some shocks while others have a positive and 
significant response to some other shocks. For example, while transit equipment, paper materials, 
chemical materials, and paper have a negative and significant response to other supply shocks 
and oil-specific demand shocks, the response to an aggregate demand shock is positive. 
Similarly, the response of petroleum and coal to an oil-specific demand shock is negative, and 
the response to an aggregate demand shock is positive. 
Having said the above, the response of most sectors for almost all shocks is negative 
when significant. The response of 19 and 21 sectors is negative and significant in response to a 
political supply shock and other supply shock, respectively. There are 16 sectors that start out 
with a positive and significant response due to an oil-specific demand shock, but ultimately the 
response becomes negative during the second and third year. in addition to these sectors, an oil-
specific demand shock leads to a purely negative response when significant from durable 
consumer goods, transit equipment, textiles materials, textiles and products, apparel and leather 
goods, plastics and rubber products, primary metal, and motor vehicles. In response to an 
aggregate demand shock, clothing, nondurable consumer, paper products, chemical products, and 
apparel and leather have a mostly negative response when significant. 
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4.2.2 Differences between the two cases 
A few important differences in the results described in the two cases are observed. First, 
for textiles and products, fabricated metal product, motor vehicles, and durable consumer goods 
other supply shocks result in significant responses for fewer horizons than when total supply 
shocks are considered in Section 4.1. Second, in the case of fabricated metal, other supply shocks 
result in significant responses for only about 13 horizons, whereas when total supply shocks are 
considered, significant responses are seen for 32 horizons. Oil-specific demand shock now 
results in a larger number of horizons (31) with significant responses compared to other supply 
shocks (13) for fabricated metal. Third, there are four sectors (primary metal, chemicals, paper 
products, and chemical materials) for which very few significant horizons were observed in 
response to supply shocks in the Section 4.1; however, these sectors have significant responses 
for at least a year in response to other supply shocks when political supply shocks are included 
separately. 
Fourth, while the responses of clothing, transit equipment, apparel and leather goods, 
fabricated metal product, and machinery to an aggregate shock have a larger number of horizons 
that are significant compared to the results seen in Section 4.1, the responses of motor vehicle, 
printing and related support industries, and chemical products have a lot fewer horizons that are 
significant. Fifth, while aggregate demand shock no longer leads to the largest number of 
significant responses from printing and related compared to all other shocks, aggregate demand 
shock does lead to more number of significant responses for textiles materials than any other 
shock. Sixth, political supply shocks have a significant impact on a few sectors, especially 
apparel and leather and clothing. There are no notable differences between the results for an oil-
specific demand shock in the two cases. 
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5. Conclusion 
While energy prices were fairly stable in the 1990s, increasing energy prices in 2000s 
have led to the question about growth in industrial production, specifically in energy intensive 
industries (Issues in Focus, Annual Energy Outlook 2007). While previous models of the oil-
price macroeconomy relationship have treated oil prices as being mainly influenced by oil supply 
shocks, Kilian (2009) finds that the real price of oil is mainly influenced by aggregate demand 
and oil-specific demand shocks, and not crude oil production disruptions. These findings make it 
necessary to study how the U.S. industrial sector is affected by each of this shocks since each of 
these shocks have different impacts on US industries through both direct effects and indirect 
effects through the real price of oil. Therefore, we extend the work done by Kilian (2009).by 
separating the effect of oil demand shocks from oil supply shocks on U.S. industrial production 
indices. We compute different structural shocks in the oil market and examine their impact on 
different IP indices. 
To summarize our results, oil supply shocks lead to a decline in 10 sectors, but an 
increase in case of motor vehicles and durable consumer goods. However, in case of the 
remaining 17 sectors, the response to an oil supply shock is not significant. Aggregate demand 
shocks lead to an initial positive impact on 9 sectors but soon after the impact becomes 
recessionary. The impulse response of 8 other sectors due to an aggregate demand shock is 
negative throughout. Lastly, the impact of oil-specific demand shock is negative and significant 
for most horizons for 20 out of the 29 sectors in our sample. In general, we confirm the finding 
by other authors that oil supply shocks are less important for studying changes in industrial 
production for several sectors than other aggregate demand shocks and oil-specific demand 
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shocks. The results don't change much when political supply shocks are explicitly included. The 
results from the latter case studied exemplify that the political supply shocks do not seem to 
matter for most sectors. 
For industrial production, the literature has generally focused on the energy intensive 
industries such as chemicals, petroleum, and primary metal while non-energy intensive sectors 
have received less attention.
4
 
However, it has been observed that non-energy-intensive sectors accounted for more than 50 
percent of the projected increase in industrial natural gas consumption from 2004 to 2030. 
(Issues in Focus, Annual Energy Outlook 2007). In addition, our results have shown that energy 
intensity of a sector is not necessarily correlated to response of a sector to an oil shock. The 
response of sectors that are energy intensive in terms of production (e.g. chemicals) and in use 
(e.g. motor vehicles) is significant for all types of oil shocks for at least 1 year. These are also 
sectors with relatively high average monthly growth rates. This result is similar to that in 
Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada (2011), where chemicals and motor vehicles have a significant 
response to a nonlinear measure of oil price. However, the results in this paper also find a 
significant response from non-energy-intensive sectors such as machinery and fabricated metal 
as seen in Section 4. Our results, therefore, highlight the importance of studying the impact of oil 
shocks on both energy intensive and metal-based non-energy-intensive sectors. 
To summarize, using industry-level production data we illustrate that the impact of an oil 
price shock can be expansionary, recessionary, or insignificant on a sector depending on the 
nature of the shock. In addition, our findings about the demand shocks demonstrate that for 
industries in the U.S., an oil shock may be perceived more as a demand shock for their products 
                                                 
4
 The energy cost averages 4.8 percent and 1.9 percent of annual operating cost for energy intensive sectors and non-
energy-intensive manufacturing industries, respectively (Issues in Focus, Annual Energy Outlook 2007). 
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than a shock to their costs of production. These results are consistent with other results in the 
existing literature (See, for instance, Kilian (2009), Lee and Ni (2002), Edelstein and Kilian 
(2007, 2009), Apergis and Miller (2009)). Further, it confirms the view discussed in Kilian and 
Park (2010) that the Federal Reserve should not respond to an oil shock but to the underlying 
supply or demand shock. Our results show that forecasting models for several industries need to 
be revised in order to not only reflect the recent oil price trends, but also take into account the 
nature of the oil shock. Moreover, these changes may have an important impact on the forecast 
for industrial energy consumption by each of these sectors. Our results also show that further 
research efforts need to focus on developing theoretical models that do not treat oil shock as 
purely an aggregate supply shock, which is treated as exogenous.  
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Table 1. Industry Code and Sample Statistics (1975.1-2004.9) 
Sector Industry 
code 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total Industrial Production B50001 0.22% 0.27% 0.01 -2.54% 2.08% 
Foods and tobacco B51211 0.12% 0.09% 0.01 -3.04% 3.02% 
Clothing B51212 -0.23% -0.15% 0.01 -5.57% 4.94% 
Durable consumer goods B51100 0.29% 0.28% 0.02 -6.55% 12.54% 
Miscellaneous durable goods B51123 0.16% 0.25% 0.01 -4.48% 3.11% 
Non durable consumer goods B51200 0.14% 0.16% 0.01 -2.47% 2.16% 
Manufacturing (SIC) B00004 0.25% 0.30% 0.01 -3.08% 2.65% 
Paper products B51214 0.16% 0.15% 0.01 -3.28% 4.41% 
Chemical products B51213 0.28% 0.23% 0.01 -4.87% 3.77% 
Transit equipment B52110 0.04% -0.04% 0.03 -9.89% 10.03% 
Textiles materials B53210 0.05% 0.14% 0.01 -4.56% 5.15% 
Paper materials B53220 0.11% 0.17% 0.01 -6.17% 5.91% 
Chemical materials B53230 0.19% 0.28% 0.01 -6.03% 4.30% 
Motor vehicles and parts G3361T3 0.21% 0.28% 0.04 -20.46% 28.48% 
Food, beverage and tobacco G311A2 0.13% 0.07% 0.01 -2.93% 3.01% 
Textiles and products G313A4 0.09% 0.12% 0.01 -4.00% 4.64% 
Apparel and leather G315A6 -0.21% -0.18% 0.01 -5.15% 4.93% 
Paper G322 0.11% 0.19% 0.02 -5.05% 6.11% 
Printing and related G323 0.18% 0.18% 0.01 -3.00% 4.19% 
Chemicals G325 0.21% 0.23% 0.01 -3.56% 3.00% 
Petroleum and coal G324 0.08% 0.12% 0.02 -6.10% 7.23% 
Plastics and rubber G326 0.32% 0.35% 0.02 -9.00% 13.19% 
Furniture and related G337 0.21% 0.22% 0.01 -5.14% 4.12% 
Primary metal G331 -0.04% 0.16% 0.03 -9.96% 10.75% 
Fabricated metal G332 0.09% 0.20% 0.01 -4.71% 1.98% 
Machinery G333 0.08% 0.23% 0.01 -5.18% 4.16% 
Electrical equipment G335 0.10% -0.01% 0.01 -5.91% 4.39% 
Motor vehicles G3361 0.36% 0.22% 0.07 -30.18% 48.77% 
Manufacturing (NAICS) GMF 0.26% 0.31% 0.01 -3.25% 2.67% 
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  Table 2. Energy intensity for selected NAICS industries and for selected years 
Sector 1998 2002 2006 
Food, beverage and tobacco 2.17 2.19 1.95 
Textiles and products 3.46 3.46 3.47 
Apparel and leather 0.75 0.72 0.47 
Paper 17.72 15.48 13.82 
Printing and related 0.98 1.02 0.85 
Chemicals 14.55 14.24 7.83 
Petroleum and coal 53.06 31.47 12.5 
Plastics and rubber 2 2.03 1.59 
Furniture and related 1.26 0.84 0.7 
Primary metal 15.4 15.11 7.46 
Fabricated metal 1.75 1.57 1.25 
Machinery 0.77 0.7 0.62 
Electrical equipment 1.23 1.65 0.86 
Motor vehicles 0.8 0.67 0.68 
Manufacturing (NAICS) 6.11 5.81 4.2 
 
 
Notes: Energy intensity is calculated as the ratio of energy consumption (Trillion Btu) to Gross 
Output (Billion 2000 Dollars). Values in bold represent high energy intensity sectors, values in 
italics represent other energy intensive sectors, and the remaining sectors are non-energy-
intensive. 
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Figure 1a: Monthly data on demand and supply side measures of oil from 1973.2 to 2004.9 
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Figure 1b: Monthly data on demand and supply side measures of oil from 1973.2 to 2004.9 
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Figure 1c: Monthly data on demand and supply side measures of oil from 1973.2 to 2004.9 
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Figure 1d: Monthly data on demand and supply side measures of oil from 1973.2 to 2004.9 
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Figure 2a: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 1 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (3) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 2b: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 1 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (3) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 2c: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 1 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (3) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 2d: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 1 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (3) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 2e: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 1 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (3) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 2f: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 1 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (3) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 3a: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 2 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (6) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 3b: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 2 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (6) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 3c: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 2 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (6) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
  
123 
 
 
 
Figure 3d: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 2 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (6) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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Figure 3e: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 2 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (6) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
  
125 
 
 
 
Figure 3f: Responses of industrial production indices to each structural shock: Case 2 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on the regression in (6) where the number of bootstrap replications to 
obtain the IRFs equal 20000. 
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